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COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
TWENTY -FIRST REPORT ON THE ACTIVmES OF THE MONETARY
COMMITTEE
FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee in the course of 1979.
During the year, the Committee held 10 sessions and the working parties drawn from its
own members or set up at its initiative met on several occasions. A list of members as at
31 December 1979 is annexed.
The report was adopted as at 31 December 1979.
I. INTRODUCI10N
I. The expansion of world economic activity was
again only moderate in 1979, with growth rates of
production and world trade similar to those of 1978.
The imbalances in the current balance of payments
positions of the major country groupings widened:
on the one hand the OPEC surplus increased sharply,
in contrast to a fall in 1978, and on the other the com-
bined OECD balance moved back into substantial
deficit and the position of the non-oil developing
countries deteriorated further. This overall picture
however, masks sharp individual differences, with
the deficit of the United States being substantially re-
duced while the Japanese and German positions
swung strongly from surplus to deficit.
2. In the Community, the process of gradual econ-
omic recovery has been shaken by the turbulent situa-
tion in the world economy, caused in particular by
the rise in oil prices. The real rate of growth was
poorer than had been anticipated, remaining about
the same as in 1978, but the rise in the level of unem-
ployment flattened out. Inflation performance also
worsened; not only did the Community average in-
crease, but the gap between the individual rates of in-
flation also widened. The development of inflation
was mainly due to a worsening in the terms of trade
as a result of higher oil and other commodity prices.
In addition, this also affected the balance of pay-
ments of Member States: the Community as a whole
moved from a substantial current account surplus in
1978 to a deficit in 1979.
II. COMMUNITY ACI10N AND THE ACI1VITIES OF THE COMMITI'EE
3. On 13 March 1979, the European Monetary Sys-
tem formally came into force, and the main work of
the Committee during the year involved overseeing
and monitoring the functioning of this new system.
4. In the context of the EMS, the Committee under-
takes periodic examinations and surveillance of de-
velopments towards convergence in each Member
State wi~ particular reference to monetary policy
and exchange rate policy. As a result, the Committee
concentrated its attention on three principal mat-
ters:
(a) surveillance of the functioning of the EMS;No C 166/2 Official Journal of the European Communities
(b) improvement in coordination of economic poli-
cies in Member States;
(c) examination of developments towards conver-
gence.
5. Surveillance of the functioning of the EMS in-
volved the Committee in detailed examinations of
fundamental aspects of the system. At its June meet-
ing it held a wide-ranging exchange of views on the
system s functioning to date, after which the chair-
man was requested to present an oral report to the
Council of 18 June. In this report, he indicated that
the Committee felt that the system had functioned
satisfactorily, but that much progress still had to be
made in improving the coordination of policies.
At its September meeting it held an exchange of
views on the six-month review of certain operating
procedures of the EMS, in accordance with the reso-
lution of the European Council of 5 December 1978.
The specific points dealt with in this review were:
the weights of currencies in the ECU;
the functioning of the divergence indicator;
the imbalances accumulated by divergent debtor
or creditor countries.
The chairman made a brief oral report to the Council
which enumerated the technical problems which had
arisen during the first six months of the EMS, but the
Committee did not recommend any modifications to
the system which it felt was working well, in the light
of the limited experience which had been accumu-
lated up to that date. It was also indicated that the
Committee would continue to examine the operation
of the system on a regular basis. At the meeting
of 17 September the Council noted that neither the
chairmen of the Monetary Committee and of the
Committee of Governors nor the Commission sug-
gested any amendments to the system. It took note of
the conclusion of the work on the review of the EMS
called for by the European Council in its resolution
of 5-December 1978 and, noting that the system had
functioned satisfactorily, declared this review com-
pleted.
6. At its January meeting, the Committee held a de-
tailed exchange of views on strengthening the co-
ordination of economic policy. For its part, it agreed
that it would carry out its examinations of economic
and monetary policy with the aim also of assessing
the compatibility of policies between Member States.
These examinations are based on papers prepared by
the Commission departments who regularly submit
to the Committee short economic policy reviews.
These are analytical papers containing a review of
the previous quarter s developments and, on the basis
of the most recent forecasts, an assessment of the out-
look for the next quarter.
7. The Committee decided that it would intensify its
practice of regularly examining the eco-
nomic and monetary policy of Menber States, with
greater emphasis on quantified analysis. During the
year it carried out detailed examinations of the econ-
omic situation in Italy, France, Ireland, Germany,
Denmark and the United Kingdom. In addition, at
every meeting, in the context of its regular 'tours
horizon , it monitored developments in the econ-
omic situation of Member States, discussed recent
policy changes, and heard a brief report from the
members appointed by the Commission on the most
recent forecasts of the outlook for the Community.
8. The resolution of the European Council of 5 De-
cember 1978 on the establishment of the EMS also
provided that 'the provisions and procedures thus
created' would be consolidated into a final system.
This system will entail the creation of the European
Monetary Fund as announced in the conclusions of
the European Council meeting at Bremen on 6 and
7 July 1978, as well as the full utilization of the ECU
as a reserve asset and a means of settlement.'
In accordance with this provision the Committee be-
gan work on the problem of the European Monetary
System after the transitional phase. At its April meet-
ing it held an initial and detailed exchange of views
on this complex subject (see twentieth report on the
activities, Annex I, Appendix: 'The Fund in its final
form ); it continued this work throughout the rest of
the year. At the meeting of the Council of 17 Decem-
ber 1979, the chairman presented an oral report on
the progress of work on this matter and summarizing
the main questions on which decisions will have to be
made, as well as those areas where considerable tech-
nical work still remains to be done. The Committee
will continue work on this subject in 1980.
9. As usual, the Committee devoted a significant
proportion of its time to international monetary
questions, in preparation for the Interim Committee
meetings in March and October, the annual meeting
of the International Monetary Fund in October, and
the meeting of the Group of Ten deputies in May.
The main questions with which the Committee had to
deal this year were: the proposals for a substitution
account, the renewal of the general arrangements to
borrow, and international liquidity.
10. The Committee also examined various other
matters such as the recourse by the Danish authorities
to Article 73 of the EEC Treaty to forbid the sale of
Government bonds denominated in Danish krone to
non-residents, on the quota to be attributed to Greece
in the Community s credit facilities, and several pro-
posals to change the conversion rates for national
currencies into units of account for the purposes of
the common agricultural policy.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/3
III. WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITI'EE
11. The working party on the harmonization of
monetary policy instruments, a joint group of the
Committee and the Committee of Governors, met
several times in 1979. It completed its work on inter-
mediate objectives, with a detailed study of the possi-
ble obstacles to their harmonization, the conclusions
of which are contained in its 'Second report' (An-
nex I), examined by the Monetary Committee at its
June meeting. The report considered it useful to have
a common analytical framework, recording in flow-
of-funds form the main aggregates used by the var-
ious Member States as intermediate objectives (as
well as other financial variables), which could be em-
ployed to facilitate comparisons between Member
States and, possibly, to predict monetary and finan-
cial variables at Community level and as a technical
instrument to asses the  ex ante  consistency of mone-
tary policy of Member States.
The Committee approved the report s recommenda-
tions and agreed to the further work on the suggested
framework. In the first stage, work will concentrate
on a thorough testing on an ex-post basis.
12. The working party on the harmonization of
monetary policy instruments also adopted a further
report on 'Certain questions relating to monetary
policy instruments' (Annex II). This report examines
the question as to whether the use of certain instru-
ments could harm neighbouring countries through its
external repercussions. The report notes that any dif-
ficulties which the use of different monetary policy
instruments might possibly cause are hard to distin-
guish from the difficulties arising from the persisting
differences between Member States in economic per-
formance and in the priorities of economic policy as
well as from external shocks to the Community s ex-
change rate system; basic factors might, however, be
accentuated in the short-term by instrumental differ-
ences. The report recommends that, when consider-
ing major monetary actions, each country take ac-
count of the likely impact on neighbouring countries
of the alternative instruments available to it and as-
sess the consequences of the envisaged action for the
smooth functioning of the EMS.
13. The working party on securities markets met
three times in 1979 and continued to examine devel-
opments in the capital markets of the Member States
and in the international bond markets and also dis-
cussed capital market policies. It furthermore began
detailed studies on two topics: the variability of inter-
est rates and the right to cancel contracts, and the
treatment of savings in equities and measures taken
to encourage it. It intends to complete its work on
these topics during 1980.No C 166/4 Official Journal of the European Communities
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. In its first interim report, the working group ex-
amined and -compared the intermediate objectives of
monetary policy applied by Member States, seeing
them as an important reference point for the coordi-
nation of monetary policy in the Community (1). To
improve and extend mutual understanding of inter-
mediate objectives, the group indicated two research
themes for its future work:
an analysis of developments in each country in
terms of the intermediate objectives pursued in
the other member countries,
the transmission mechanism and related struc-
tural problems.
2. Accordingly, the group examined the statistical
series in each country which most closely correspond
to the intermediate objectives adopted in the other
member countries. While the study helped to make
the intermediate objectives of each country easier to
understand and evaluate, it became apparent that
problems of theory, definition and availability of sta-
tistical series impeded in certain cases the quantifica-
tion in one country of intermediate objectives ad-
opted in others.
3. The group s study of the transmission mecha-
nism drew on the available studies of the relation-
ships between the financial variables (money, credit
interest rates) which are directly influenced by the ac-
tions of the monetary authorities, and the final objec-
tives of economic policy. A synopsis of the group
work on this subject is annexed.
4. The working group closely examined the choice
of intermediate objectives in the light of differences
of financial structures. The aim was to test, on the
basis of quantified data, the validity of some of the
explanations in the first interim report for the differ-
ent intermediate objectives set by Member States.
The work carried out by the group also led to a more
precise evaluation of the importance of other ele-
ments, such as the institutional aspect and the theore-
tical approach, in the choice of intermediate objec-
tives.
5. Throughout its studies the group concentrated its
attention on quantitative intermediate objectives. As
a consequence, the policy of countries, such as Bel-
gium, which most of the time do not express their ob-
jectives in quantitative terms because they want to re-
tain more freedom for their interest rate policy, is
only partially covered.
6. The report begins by studying the financial struc-
tures to provide more background for the interme-
diate objectives and to prepare the introduction of a
common framework of analysis. The report then
turns to the obstacles to the harmonization of inter-
mediate objectives. It discusses obstacles in the exist-
ing systems:
differences in financial structures,
institutional factors.
It goes on to consider the differences between the ap-
proaches to economic analysis in each country:
differences in theoretical approaches
each country s assessment of the transmission
mechanism linking intermediate to final objec-
tives.
It then studies the influence of the external posi-
tion.
The report ends with some recommendations aimed
at developing a practical tool which should facilitate
progress towards coordination of monetary policies.
Such a development 'is of particular relevance in the
context of the European Monetary System.
II. FINANCIAL STRUcruRES AND INTERMEDIATE OBJECI1VES
7. The study of financial structures has been carried
out with the aim of arriving at a better understanding
of the different intermediate objectives by placing
them in a broader and uniform financial context. The
working group has concentrated mainly on (total
(I) 'Coordination' is the process whereby countries discuss
their policy approaches and objectives and adjust them
to be compatible. Policy approaches and objectives are
compatible' if their successful implementation in one
country does not prevent the implementation of a policy
approach or objective in another country. 'Harmoniza-
tion' is taken to mean that a uniform concept, such as
harmonized M2 (M2H), is used to define the stance of
monetary policy.
domestic) credit and on the money supply (particu-
larly on the broader concepts of M2 and M3), endea-
vouring to shed light on the accounting and func-
tional relationships that exist between both these ag-
gregates and among their different definitions. The
broader concepts of money supply (M2 and M3) have
received particular attention as monetary authorities
of the Member States do not generally consider M1 
an appropriate intermediate target, though it may at
times be useful as an indicator. The broader concepts
of credit and of money supply appear to be generally
more stable in relation to income than narrower ag-
gregates such as MI. Nevertheless, the phenomenoQ
of substitution which influences narrower aggregatesNo C 166/8 Official Journal of the European Communities
more than wider aggregates still leads to some short-
term fluctuations in the latter. The trends of the wider
definitions of credit and money supply are moreover
often parallel, though the outstanding amounts are
very different.
A. Accounting relationships: global credit, DCE  and
money
8. The more commonly used intermediate objec-
tives may be analyzed with the aid of Table I which
shows the accounting and functional relationships
existing between the quantitative intermediate objec-
tives applied by Member States (in this analysis the
concept of central bank money applied in Germany
is replaced by M3).
9.  Global credit  of domestic and foreign origin in
its widest definitions is made up of the sum of items I
to 5, namely of all the funds obtained by public and
private sectors from the financial intermediaries, the
capital market and abroad. Other definitions of cre-
dit are given by the sum of only certain components
of this total. Global credit gives rise to the formation
of new financial assets: money, other deposits, secu-
rities and foreign assets (items 8 to 12 of the table),
the difference between global credit and total forma-
tion of private sector financial assets being repre-
sented by the balance of payments on current ac-
count.
Global credit also reveals certain structural features
of the economy; its absolute value is a function of the
net financial position of the various sectors (house-
holds, enterprises and public sector). As a conse-
quence, in principle, the higher the public sector s de-
ficit and the greater the difference between invest-
ment and self-financing on the part of enterprises
the larger the amount of global credit; differences in
the borrowing requirements of the public sector and
of enterprises are therefore the main explanation of
the differences in global credit  vis-a-vis  GDP within
the Community as presented in Table 1. Neverthe-
less, to some extent, the absolute amount of global
credit (and, for that matter, of harmonized M2), is
also related to the intra-sectoral lending and borrow-
ing which passes through financial intermediaries or
the financial markets; this intra-sectoral relationship
is particularly marked in the field of residential con-
struction, where households are both lenders and
borrowers of funds for construction. The concept of
global credit does, however, exclude transactions
such as trade credit, which do not pass through finan-
cial intermediaries or the financial markets.
10. The concept of total credit used in Italy corre-
sponds to the sum of items 1 to 4 of Table 1, equiva-
lent to  total domestic credit(l).  In Belgium, when
(I) However, the concept of credit, in the economic policy
conditions laid down for Italy, excludes the issue of
shares in order to bring about a better balance between
finns' indebtedness and own resources.
credit norms are adopted, they are applied only to
items I and 2 to that part of item 3 accounted for by
financial institutions: equivalent to domestic credit
to the private sector. Nevertheless, the setting of cre-
dit norms in Belgium is based on a global credit ap-
proach which takes into consideration the public sec-
tor deficit and an estimated supply of funds to the
private sector from the domestic capital market and
from abroad; if developments in these elements dif-
fer from estimates used in the setting of the credit
norms, then the credit norms are changed. Conse-
quently, the difference in credit targets between Bel-
gium and Italy is one of form and not of sub-
stance.
11. The concept of  domestic credit expansion
(DC E) adopted in the United Kingdom and in Ire-
land corresponds to item I plus that part of item 4
which is not covered by placing securities with non-
bank private sectors. For Denmark, one must also
take into account the substantial indirect support
given at times by banks to other financial interme-
diaries and to enterprises (Le. to the sectots of items 2
and 3) through purchases of their bonds.
DCE represents the domestic counterpart of money
creation. In setting a target in terms of DCE the au-
thorities aim to have an effect on the balance of pay-
ments by acting on domestic liquidity and in this
sense therefore the adoption of DCE implies an ap-
proach which has much in common with those adopt-
ing a broad money stock objective.
12. Unlike Belgium and Italy, most countries be-
lieve that the composition of financial assets (espe-
cially the importance of money  vis-a-vis  non-liquid
assets) is of paramount importance in the transmis-
sion mechanism; as a consequence, they consider the
evolution of  money supply  as most indicative of the
thrust of monetary policy. (This implies, of course
that monetary authorities have proper instruments
and regulations for controlling money supply, in the
sense of moving it in the desired direction and of
keeping it on a certain growth path, although short
term fluctuations cannot be avoided.) These coun-
tries also emphasize the importance of the evolution
of money supply in influencing expectations about
inflation and the exchange rate.
Certainly, domestic expenditure is also influenced by
non-monetary factors and, therefore, it is possible for
a high degree of liquidity to build up without affect-
ing prices immediately; nevertheless this constitutes
an inflationary potential which may threaten stability
once conditions change. Analysis of the past expe-
rience with monetary movements may reveal the ex-
istence of such a potential.
The definition of money supply nevertheless varies
considerably from country to country; this problem
will be dealt with in paragraphs 17 to 19.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/9
B. Application of the accounting relationships
13. Table I presents the average yearly data from
1973 to 1976 for global credit and the formation of
private sector financial assets in each member coun-
try as a percentage of GDP. In the period considered
the flow of total domestic credit as a proportion of
GDP varied a great deal between member countries
Germany and France recording the lowest ratio to
GDP (9 to 12 %) and Ireland and Italy the highest (22
to 25 %). It is obvious that these differences reflect,
more than the stance of monetary policy, differences
in structures (such as the public sector deficit and the
degree of enterprises' self- financing, as will be seen
in III A).
Nevertheless, such structural features may create
problems for the implementation of monetary policy,
and may have a bearing on inflation and balance of
payments equilibrium.
14. DCE does not appear directly in Table 1, but a
proxy can be obtained by adding to the nationally de-
fined money creation during the period (item 8) the
destruction of liquidity provoked by the deficit of the
balance of payments on current account (item 6) and
the net non-bank capital outflows (items 5 and 12).
In the average of the period, DCE represented 53 %
of total domestic credit in the United Kingdom, 55 %
in Denmark, 63 % in Ireland and 84 % in Italy. In
fact, the larger the share of money supply on the total
of financial assets (see Tables 1 and 2) the larger the
proportion of DCE on total domestic credit.
15. Table  also shows that during the period
money supply represented a large part (and at times
the largest part) of the formation of new financial as-
sets. In general the larger the proportion of global
credit to both public and private sectors which goes
through deposit-taking institutions, the larger the
share of money in total financial assets. However, ac-
count must be taken of the fact that in some countries
(as in Germany) a substantial part of deposit-taking
institutions' liabilities have an extended maturity and
are therefore not counted as money.T
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The analysis of the relationship between financial assets may be furthered on the basis
of stock figures (Table 2).
TABLE 2
Outstanding private sector financial assets as a percentage of GDP (end 1975)
IRL
Money supply on national definition (47) (74) (53) (54) (67) (111) (35) (39)
Harmonized M2 112
Other private sector holdings with
credit institutions
Private sector holdings of securities
issued by private and public sector 20(1)
Total 110 123 117 108 152 102 138
Harmonized M2 as % of total
(I) Only marketable government securities.
Differences in the relation of total financial assets to
GDP between countries are much less marked for
stock data than for flow data in the period 1973 to
1976. It follows that the divergences between coun-
tries regarding sectoral surpluses and deficits are to
be attributed mainly to recent developments.
16. The liquidity ratio as measured by relationship
in percent between harmonized M2 and nominal
GDP, varies from 111 in Italy to ,47 in Germany. The
proportion of harmonized M2 in the total of private
sector financial assets exceeds 50 % in every country
except Germany; this indicates that in most member
countries financial savings are very liquid.
17. The table also shows considerable differences in
some countries between the national definition of
money supply and the harmonized definition; this is
seen by expressing the nationally most significant
money aggregate (M2, M3) as a percentage of the har-
monized definition. At the end of 1977 these percen-
tages were:
100. 106.5
DK  IRL  Nt UK
100 67.5 73.8 99. 57.8 48.
Member countries generally have a preference for a
wider definition of money supply, close to harmon-
ized M2. Institutional reasons may to some extent ex-
plain the use of a narrower aggregate in France and
in the United Kingdom (see paragraph 26). In the
Netherlands monetary authorities prefer a narrower
monetary aggregate mainly on theoretical grounds.
18. Differences in the financial structure can how-
ever have important implications for the definition
and the significance of the money supply. In Ger-
many, M3 (which is similar to harmonized M2) repre-
sents approximately 50 % of the liabilities of the
banking system  vis-Ii-vis  the private sector; con-
versely in the United Kingdom, the definition of M3
roughly corresponds to the total liabilities of the
banking system, while if one applied the same defini-
tion as that of German M3 (or harmonized M2) in the
United Kingdom, this aggregate would include lia-
bilities of other financial intermediaries of various
types, such as building societies. In such cases, in ad-
dition to differences in the financial structure there
are differences relating to the definition of the bank-
ing system.
19. Even if a common definition of money supply
(such as harmonized M2) were to be taken for all
countries, in each country this would correspond to a
different proportion of credit institutions' liabilities,
as well as a different proportion of the banking sys-
tem itself. The scheme on the following page illus-
trates this point through the relative importance of
banks and other credit institutions in each member
country, as well as their contribution to money crea-
tion, as measured by harmonized M2.No C 166/12 Official Journal of the European Communities
LIABILmES OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 'VIS-A-VIS' THE PRIVATE SECfOR
(percentage on total assets, end 1975)
100-
liD
80-
60-
40-
20-
liD
IRL
I monetary institutions (including treasury as issuer of notes and coins and components of secon-
dary M).
II other credit institutions.
0 M2H = notes and coins, demand deposits, other assets of a maximum maturity of one
year,
other assets.
III. EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE HARMONIZATION OF INTER-
MEDIATE O&JECflVES
A. Financial structures
20. The examination of structural data allowed the
group to take a closer look at the phenomenon of
substitution. It may be noted that, despite the fact
that money supply normally represents a very large
share of total financial assets in all Member States
(see Table 2), there remains a considerable margin
for substitution between money and other financial
assets. The analysis of the years under review and the
comparison of intermediate objectives showed that
some substitution took place in all countries (with the
possible exception of France), causing at times
through interest induced shifts significant distortions
to the trend of the money supply.
While in Italy and Belgium substitution led to the re-
jection of money supply as an intermediate objective
(in Belgium s case it is rejected as an operational vari-
able when the authorities have a quantitative inter-
mediate objective), in the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands and Germany, where substitution was
also important, the authorities saw insufficient rea-
son in this not to adopt money supply as an interme-
diate objective.
21. Faced with the phenomenon of substitution, the
authorities may, indeed, adopt the concept of global
credit, but such a decision is probably a sign that they
regard the liquidity of the economy (as measured by
money supply and its variations) of minor impor-Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/13
tance. If, on the other hand, liquidity is considered of
great importance as an intermediate objective or as
an indicator, statistical adjustments are made or spe-
cific measures taken to maintain the validity of the
indicator of liquidity. In 1977, the Netherlands bank
developed a small econometric model to correct the
M2 series for switches between savings deposits (in-
cluded in M3) and time deposits (only in M2). Since
April 1978, this adjustment is no longer necessary as
a new M2 definition was adopted excluding all time
deposits by private individuals up to FI 500000; in
Germany the analoguous large scale distortion of the
M2 series in 1973 to 1974 was one of the reasons for
adopting the concept of central bank money which
mirrors the wider concept of M3. In the United King-
dom, one of the aims of the introduction of the ' sup-
plementary special deposits scheme' in 1973 was to
stop interest arbitrage transactions between bank
lending and time deposits, inflating both (a phenom-
enon known as the 'merry-go-round'
22. As with substitution, no specific evidence was
found for an influence of the size of the public deficit
on the choice of the intermediate objective. The pub-
lic deficit was at times very large in countries which
use credit as an intermediate objective as well as in
those which use the money supply.
23. Furthermore, the size of the private sector s in-
debtedness  vis-a-vis  the financial intermediaries (see
Table 3) does not seem to constitute a decisive ele-
ment in the choice of intermediate objectives, as
shown by the situation in the two most 'credit-
oriented' countries. In Belgium, total credit to the
private sector is actually lower than the Community
average; in Italy, while the flow figures for 1973 to
1976 are in fact rather high, the stock figures show
that at the end of 1975 the outstanding credit was not
significantly different from that in France or in Ger-
many. Only in Denmark may one say that some at-
tention is paid to global credit due to the fact that a
large part of this credit is granted by non-bank credit
institutions.
24. In conclusion, differences in structures do not
seem to have a major influence on the choice of a par-
ticular intermediate objective; nevertheless, study
and comparison of financial structures is essential in
order to understand the significance of the objectives
in different financial contexts.
B. Institutional factors
25. One aspect of institutional differences which
may be relevant for intermediate objectives relates to
the type and extent of the controls exercised by the
authorities over financial intermediaries. Controls, in
the sense of instructions given to financial interme-
diaries, are generally closest over the banking sys-
tem; whereas the coverage of controls over other
financial institutions varies among member coun-
TABLE 3
CREDITS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Ger- Bel- Den- Nether- United
many gium mark France Ireland Italy lands King-
dom
1. Credit to private sector
(1973 to 1976 average flows in %
GDP):
by banks 4,9 3.9 5'5 7.6 7.9 6,9 4.5
other financial intermedi-
anes 1.3 4.2 11,1 3.9 2.5 6.4 4.6 3.0
Total 6-2 7,3 15.0 9.4 10.1 14.3 11.5 7.5
2, Claims of credit institutions on pri-
vate sector (outstanding amounts in
% of GDP at 31 December 1975):
credit
securities
Total, end 1975
Memorandum item:
Total, end 1965 102No C 166/14 Official Journal of the European Communities
tries. The statistical data available reflect these differ-
ences in control and supervision. Such differences in
controls can be correctly evaluated only by taking
into account that the relative importance of non-
bank financial intermediaries as well as the nature of
their operations (for instance, the degree of liquidity
of their liabilities) vary widely from country to coun-
try. Some major aspects of these differences have
been sketched out in paragraphs 18 and 19.
26. For example, the choice in France of M2, an ag-
gregate which roughly represents the liabilities of the
banking system, is accounted for by both historical
and institutional considerations. Until recently only
banks could offer chequing accounts whereas most of
the so-called liquid savings were placed with other
financial institutions. Because of this dichotomy, the
French monetary authorities have always adapted
their instruments and _determined their targets so as
to take account of the activities of the banking sys-
tem. Although at present the same kind of financial
assets is often held by both banks and non-banks, en-
larging the scope of monetary policy to the latter
would create serious problems  availability and
consistency of data, implementation of credit ceil-
ings or reserve requirements.
In the United Kingdom .the choice of sterling M3, an
aggregate between M 1 and M2H which excludes na-
tional savings and deposits with building societies, or
on the other side of the balance sheet, the choice of
DCE, is influenced on the one hand by its close rela-
tionship with fiscal policy (via the component in pub- .
lic sector borrowing met other than from the non-
bank private sector), and on the other hand by the
fact that monetary controls (reserve ratios and the
supplementary special deposit control over the
growth of banks' liabilities) do not extend beyond the
commercial banks, and that statistics for other finan-
cial flows are not available on a basis consistent with
the banking figures.
27. The influence of institutional factors on the
choice of intermediate objectives should not however
be over-estimated. In general, these differences do
not influence the choice of the type of aggregate
(credit or money) but whether a narrow or broad de-
finition of the aggregate is adopted. Moreover, the
monetary authorities in each country have at their
disposal the type of controls (and data) they esteem
useful for the implementation of monetary policy. It
may therefore be argued that in general the choice of
intermediate objectives does not depend on the type
and the extent of the controls available, but rather
that these controls and the intermediate objectives
are both determined by the way monetary policy is
conceived in each member country. As a conse-
quence, institutional differences represent an obsta-
cle to harmonization only in the short run.
C. The theoretical approach
28. The work of the group demonstrated that the
theoretical approach is an important element in the
choice of intermediate objectives. (It should be noted
that this approach also influences the direction of re-
search in a country and therefore, to some extent, the
results of the study on the transmission mechanism.
The intellectual framework for fixing norms, either
for money or for global credit, is different in the two
cases: a norm in terms of money supply implies the
use of such concepts as velocity of circulation, liqui-
dity ratio and/or demand for money; a credit norm
on the contrary, suggests a comparison of, and a
search for coherence among, sectoral deficits and
surpluses, including the position of the foreign sec-
tor.
29. Views underlying the attitude of the authorities
in the Member States lie between the pure Keynesian
and monetary concepts. The group feels that a strong
influence on the choice of intermediate objectives is
exerted by traditional and historical concepts in the
various countries. Generally speaking, countries such
as Belgium and Italy, which adopt total credit as an
intermediate objective, stress the short-term relation-
ship between credit and total demand; countries
which use money, on the contrary, concentrate on the
more long-run relationships between money stock
and GNP or prices.
Theory has demonstrated that a monetary policy
based on a quantitative monetary target may be con-
sistent with a Keynesian framework of analysis, if
economic disturbances have their origin in the real
sector. A fall in investment leading to a reduced
growth of bank credit (and of money supply) will
lead the monetary authorities to take action in order
to lower banks' interest rates if they are pursuing an
objective expressed in terms of a monetary aggregate
thereby encouraging a recovery of investment (and
so behaving in a counter-cyclical way). A further in-
dication of the theoretical stance of the authorities
- may be found in the criteria applied (e.g. velocity of
circulation) for quantifying the target in terms of
money supply.
30. Even though the theoretical differences should
not be underestimated (a narrowing of such differ-
ences being considered desirable), it seems that at
least at a practical level the two positions are not
irreconcilable.
A clear example of this possibility is offered by the
methodology followed in the United Kingdom
where the money supply is forecast on the basis of a
flow-of-funds account, and is then tested with refer-
ence to the implication of the forecast for the velocity
of circulation.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/15
D. The transmission mechanism linking intermediate
to final objectives
31. The group has examined the mechanisms by
which the intermediate objectives of each Member
State have their effect on the final objectives of
economic policy, both in order to throw some light
on the appropriateness of the intermediate objectives
presently adopted, and in order to provide some gen-
eral insight into the effects which the actions of mon-
etary authorities may be expected to have. The find-
ings  whether based on econometric research or on
operational experience  are those at present consi-
dered by the national authorities to be the best availa-
ble and take due account of the complexities of each
national situation. The results of this investigation
are annexed to this report.
32. Two types of mechanism dominate:
The first, with general or pervasive effects on ex-
penditure as a whole, is a result of reactions on
the pan of economic agents to 'disequilibrium
money holdings: their attempts to run down un-
needed money balances (or to build up holdings
considered too low) directly increase (or reduce)
the flow of nominal expenditure in the economy.
Problems however arise in trying to distinguish
equilibrium from disequilibrium holdings and in
quantifying the desire to hold money balances;
the latter will depend in part on the extent to
which money is a savings medium (or portfolio
asset) or even the predominant savings medium
in an economy.
The second type of transmission mechanism has a
selective effect on expenditure, acting through the
rate of interest and other conditions at which
credit is available, to influence those types of ex-
penditure which are largely financed by credit, es-
pecially the various forms of real investment.
Both types of mechanism may be present, and in gen-
eral probably will be present, in anyone country.
Transmission of either type will change both real de-
mand and, probably, the price level, and then have
an indirect effect on the current account of the bal-
ance of payments; but changes in interest rates and
the availability of credit will have more immediate
and probably larger, effects on external capital
flows.
33. In  France,  the first type of mechanism has been
clearly identified, but the level of interest rates has
not been demonstrated to affect industrial fixed in-
vestment in that country. The preference of the
French authorities for an intermediate objective ex-
pressed in terms of M2 thus receives support from the
empirical evidence. On the other hand, there is evi-
dence that both types of mechanism operate in the
United Kingdom  and the  Federal Republic of Ger-
many.  Researchers in both countries have identified
the factors which determine the demand for money
(in the United Kingdom, the demand for money nar-
rowly defined (Ml)). It also appears that industrial
fixed investment, stock-building and residential con-
. struction are influenced in both countries by the cost
of capital. In the United Kingdom it has been noted
that the broadly defined money stock has an in-
fluence on the exchange rate and, through asset
prices, on inflation.
It might therefore seem that the authorities of the
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom have the
option to express their intermediate objectives in
terms of interest rates. In fact, however, empirical
work does not enable a 'correct' level of nominal in-
terest rates to be identified at each juncture in either
country, and the authorities, fearing that a policy
based on interest rates might be too accommodating
towards inflationary pressures, have preferred to
frame their intermediate objectives in terms of mone-
tary aggregates: sterling M3 in the United Kingdom
and central bank money in the Federal Republic.
34. The experts of two Member States presented
evidence that at least in the short run the supply of
total credit stands in a much closer relation to expen-
diture than does the money stock. On this basis it
must be concluded that both  Belgium  and  Italy  are
justified in framing their quantitative intermediate
objectives in terms of credit; in both these countries
action by the monetary authorities has a major im-
pact on the various forms of real investment. In  Den-
mark  there is some evidence of a stable demand for
money, but the authorities adopt an intermediate ob-
jective expressed in terms of domestic credit in order
to ensure a certain amount of foreign borrowing 
Danish firms.
35. There was a general feeling in the group that re-
search in this area is still surrounded by uncertainties
and inevitably conditioned to some extent by the
theoretical pre-suppositions of national authorities
but with these reservations it can be concluded that
the available evidence in general tends to support the
type of intermediate objective adopted in each mem-
ber country and in no case indicates that it is inap-
propriate.
36. While tentative conclusions can be drawn about
the effect of monetary policy on nominal expenditure
in all member countries, the timing of that effect and
its division between changes in real output and
changes in prices are less certain. They depend in
part on factors outside the scope of monetary policy,
including the behaviour, in conditions of imperfect
competition, of those having some influence over the
level of costs and prices, both current and prospec-
tive. Undesirable effects of monetary policy on realNo C 166/16 Official Journal of the European Communities
output will be minimized if economic agents are fully
aware that the monetary authorities will not accom-
modate excessive rates of inflation.
37. Monetary conditions in a country may have a
considerable effect on its external accounts. If meas-
ures taken by the monetary authorities induce
changes in prices and real incomes, they will proba-
bly thereby have an indirect impact on the current ac-
count of the balance of payments; but in practice the
impact of interest rate changes on short-term capital
flows will be more pronounced and more immediate
In many cases.
38. In many countries, and in particular in Bel-
gium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland, the ex-
ternal capital flows provoked by a change in the
stance of monetary policy can offset its impact on the
domestic economy to some extent, but all member
countries have some scope for an independent mone-
tary policy.
E. The external position
39. The external position of a country may also in-
fluence the choice of intermediate objectives. In fact
the type of objective adopted and the figure put upon
it have a relationship with the country s external
equilibrium in its twofold aspect of the balance of
payments and the exchange rate. Mainly deficit
countries adopt a credit objective: they limit credit
expansion in order to control the external deficit, try-
ing to avoid exchange rate adjustments as devalua-
tion fuels inflation. They therefore have an implicit
target for their exchange rate.
In particular, an objective in terms of domestic credit
expansion implies that the monetary authorities do
not offset any destruction of liquidity which stems
from a deficit of the balance of payments larger than
forecast (of course, this also implies that at the same
time monetary authorities intervene on the market in
order to defend the exchange rate); in this way a kind
of automatic stabilization is introduced in the system
because the deficit of the balance of payments then
automatically tightens internal monetary conditions,
restoring equilibrium through the current and capital
accounts. A global credit objective limits the creation
of total financial assets but the authorities remain
free to choose its composition between liquid and
non-liquid assets. This composition determines the
actual degree of monetary restriction.
Nevertheless, in some cases targets in terms of credit
aim at influencing, for balance of payments reasons,
also the distribution of credit by domestic and exter-
nal sources; in Denmark for instance credit policy
and targets aim at keeping total domestic and exter-
nal credit within limits compatible with a gradual re-
duction of the current account deficit, while at the
same time encouraging the private sector to cover
part of its borrowing requirements abroad, in order
to finance the deficit on current account. In Ireland
the setting of an intermediate objective in terms of
domestic credit is designed to achieve a particular
evolution of the official external reserves.
40. On the other hand, countries which have an ob-
jective expressed in terms of the money stock are
mainly surplus countries which wish to limit the in-
flow of money from abroad in order to maintain
price stability: they may therefore accept a float of
the exchange rate, an actual appreciation of the na-
tional currency helping to reduce the rate of infla-
tion.
In any case, even surplus countries may, for internal
reasons (an excessive appreciation of their currency
may curb exports) be forced to counteract too sharp
an appreciation of their currency by intervening on
the market; in this way, a dilemma may arise between
control of the exchange rate and expansion of the
monetary aggregates. In the case of the 'snake' coun-
tries, the commitment to intervene in the market in
order to stabilize the exchange rate can, at least in the
short-run, provoke serious problems for the control
of the money supply.
41. There are instances where external considera-
tions influence not so much the general choice of one
type of intermediate objective compared with an-
other, as the actual figure put to the objective once
the choice of a particular type of intermediate' objec-
tive has been made.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
42. A large majority of the group believes quantita-
tive intermediate objectives should be given a central
role in the coordination of monetary policies as part
of overall economic policies to improve convergence.
This coordination would from a practical point of
view be greatly facilitated if it were possible to define
the stance of monetary policy in terms of the same in-
termediate objective, e.g. M2H. The group s studies
indicated however that such harmonization would
encounter a number of obstacles that are summarized
in the following paragraphs.
43.  Institutional and structural  differences present
some obstacles to harmonization on the practical
level, at least in the short-run, because the powers
available to central banks and in particular the insti-Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/17
tutions to which they extend are the result of histori-
cal tradition, which is often difficult to change. How-
ever, in view of the extensive arsenal of instruments
already available in all member countries this natural
delay in legislative or other action should not be a
major obstacle to harmonization.
Whereas the obstacles arising from these institutional
differences could over time be eliminated through
appropriate legislative action, the same does not
apply to structural differences in the financial system
itself. A national parliament may be willing to extend
the central bank's powers of control to institutions so
far not subject to such control but they are unlikely to
change for the sake of harmonization the institu-
tional set-up of, for example, housing finance, on the
model of some other member or a 'Community' mod-
el. Changing financial structures may be even more
difficult.
44. As far as the  theoretical approach  is concerned
the choice between total credit and money as inter-
mediate objective does to some extent seem to reflect
differences between more basic 'Keynesian' and
monetarist' orientations. The group has found , how-
ever, that no extreme positions are represented
among the underlying attitudes of the authorities in
Member States. Consequently some narrowing of
this divergence should be possible and, at least on the
practical level, the two positions should not be irre-
concilable.
45. The evidence presented by the experts of Bel-
gium and Italy on the  transmission mechanism 
their countries indicates that at least in the short run
the supply of total credit stands in a closer relation to
expenditure than does the money stock. Accordingly,
at the present stage of harmonization these members
would seem justified in framing their intermediate
objectives in terms of total credit of domestic ori-
gm.
46. The choice of an intermediate objective is in-
fluenced by the  countrys economic position in par-
ticular its balance of payments situation and the size
and openness of its economy.
As noted earlier, countries in balance of pay-
ments deficit usually choose total domestic credit
or the domestic counterparts of M2 (DCE) as their
intermediate objective whereas surplus countries
prefer a measure of money supply. In this way
monetary policy aims to strengthen the balance of
payments of deficit countries and to neutralize
the effect on domestic liquidity of a balance of
payments surplus. This difference in approach
would, however, seem to be one of the easiest to
reconcile. If, for instance, a deficit country selects
DCE as its intermediate objective, it would prob-
ably have some idea of the expected current ac-
count deficit and desired level of private borrow-
ing abroad and thus be able to derive an implied
outcome for monetary growth from a DCE tar-
get.
The size and openness of an economy would seem
to influence not so much the choice of an interme-
diate objective as the possibility of a certain quan-
tified target because potential foreign exchange
movements will be larger relative to the size of the
domestic economy in a small open economy. This
does not, however, prevent an  ex ante  coordina-
tion of economic policies on the basis of quanti-
fied targets but subsequent deviations must be ac-
ceptable in particular if they are caused by un-
foreseen foreign exchange flows. Furthermore
this limits the possibilities of achieving an 'an-
nouncement' effect as the authorities would run
the danger of losing credibility if they were
strongly committed to a publicized target that
could not be achieved.
47. While the group s analysis has shown that dif-
ferences in the choice of intermediate objectives de-
pend on many factors, none may be identified 
dominant.
48. The groups feels that, owing to the obstacles
mentioned, harmonization of monetary policy is dif-
ficult to attain in the present environment and is a
longer term goal that might harm economies if at pre-
sent implemented. Until further progress is made to-
wards economic and monetary union, coordination
is recommended as an essential element to improve
understanding and to prepare for final hamoniza-
tion. The group stresses the need that coordination 
monetary policies should be seen as part of wider ef-
forts to improve coordination more generally.
V, RECOMMENDATIONS
49. The group believes that, as a step towards har-
monization of monetary policy, coordination should
be improved by the greater exchange of information
between countries. An analytical framework along
the lines presented in Annex I, linking sources and
uses of financial assets, could be useful in this re-
spect. By placing the principal intermediate mone-
tary objectives of all countries into a common frame-
work, comparisons would be facilitated.
50. With reference to the functional relationships
mentioned in paragraph 10 and given the importance
of coordination, it is recommended that, for exam-
ple, countries using credit as an intermediate objec-No C 166/18 Official Journal of the European Communities
tive should also consider the development of the
money supply as a relevant criterion for monetary
policy; conversely, countries using money supply
targets would consider credit developments as rele-
vant to the real sector of the economy. This is in fact
. the situation  though to a different degree  al-
ready in existence in the member countries. Imple-
mentation of this recommendation might take the
following form in determining the amount of its in-
termediate objective a member country takes a total
view of money, credit and the real sectors of the
economy. In so doing, the country aims at consist-
ency of the amount of its concept of money and the
amount of credit as taken from estimated real de-
mand in the various sectors. Demand-for-money
studies could assist in determining the relative impor-
tance of the various relevant criteria.
51. The aim of the analysis proposed in para-
graph 49 might be a common effort to forecast the
scheme s main aggregates. Some of this material, e.
the public sector deficit and the balance of payments
on current account, is already available to the Com-
mission in the context of the preparation of the eco-
nomic budgets and the annual economic review of
the situation in the Community and could be made
available to the working group. The financial fore-
casts made available for the framework would be
kept in strict confidence and not made public. Of
course, an individual country would be free to pub-
lish its own forecasts to obtain an announcement ef-
f ect.
52. The framework will be valuable for the ex-
change and interpretation of information which is a
necessary basis for coordination, even though it is ac-
knowledged that there are problems inherent in fore-
casting monetary and financial developments.
53. The group will investigate (1) the extent to which
the framework provides a technical means for judg-
ing the  ex ante  consistency of the monetary policy of
Member States.
(1) In the opinion of some members it may however turn
out that the difficulties of gauging financial flows are
such that any judgment on consistency based on these
forecasts would be highly tentative and, where financial
forecasting methodology is not yet sufficiently well-de-
veloped, possibly unreliable.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/19
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APPENDIX 
THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
1. Item 5 of the group s terms of reference requires the
members to study the links between liquidity and the real
economy of Member States, and the group has therefore
given considerable attention since the appearance of the in-
terim report to elucidating the transmission mechanisms by
which monetary phenomena have their impact on inflation
and real output in the Community. In this part of its work
the group s attention has thus been focused on the relation-
ships between the intermediate objectives of monetary pol-
icy and the final objectives at which policy aims in the real
economy, but account has been taken of the fact that official
action designed to influence quantitative intermediate ob-
jectives (for example, a rise in the official re-discount rate)
can have direct implications for the wider economy. The ex-
perts of each member country have submitted papers setting
out what is known about transmission in the Member States
and have answered a questionnaire prepared by the Com-
mission. On many points these contributions were ex-
tremely tentative and it was, indeed, remarked at one point
that we are still in a pre-scientific age in this matter. The fol-
lowing paragraphs first set out the main mechanisms, which
might on theoretical grounds be expected to be present in
any country and then examine the extent to which they have
been identified in each Member State, relating these find-
ings to the policies currently adopted by national authori-
ties,
1, It is unlikely that the economic agents in any country
will at any time be indifferent to their holdings of money,
Their attempts to spend unwanted money balances (or to re-
plenish holdings considered too low) will not, of course, di-
rectly change the money stock but they will increase (or re-
duce) the flow of nominal expenditure until it reaches a
level at which existing money holdings correspond to de-
sired holdings, if such an equilibrium can be reached.
These changes in nominal expenditure may correspond to
changes in real output, to changes in the price level or to
some mixture of the two, depending on the level of unused
capacity in the economy, and the behaviour, in conditions
of imperfect competition, of those having some influence
on the level of costs and prices. Much therefore depends on
whether the desire to hold money balances is stable and
quantifiable, Elementary theory suggests that it will be some
function of nominal expenditure, the yield of money hold-
ings and the yield of competing assets. Considerable care
has to be taken in identifying these last factors: if a narrow
definition of money is applied in an economy in which non-
monetary savings media predominate, a rise in the general
level of interest rates may reduce the demand for money,
whereas in a country in which bank deposits are virtually
the only form in which savings are held a rise in the general
level of interest rates may will increase the demand for
money (at least on a broad definition),
Reactions to disequilibrium money holdings may be ex-
pected to cause  general, pervasive  shifts in expenditure. At.
tempts to identify demand-for-money equations are, how-
ever, bedevilled by the problem of distinguishing equili-
brium from disequilibrium holdings: the German experts
drew attention to this problem and no member of the group
specifically claimed to have resolved it.
2. The major counterpart of the money supply is bank
lending and the monetary conditions of an economy are ex-
pressed not only in the level of the money stock but also in
the interest rate at which (and the conditions in which) bank
credit is available, and the repercussions in the bond mar-
ket. The cost of borrowed funds is one of the determinants
of the profitability of fixed investment by private firms, and
may also influence the behaviour of public bodies which for
various reasons set a limit to the debt service charge which
they will incur. Short-term interest rates have a strong in-
fluence on the profitability of holding stocks, It is frequently
said that interest rate costs have a large influence on resi-
dential construction, but the underlying problem is often
that specialized financial intermediaries fail to adjust their
deposit rates and therefore suffer discontinuities in their in-
termediation.
Interest rates in general may change either as a result of
changes on the supply side in the bank credit market or as a
more direct response to central bank action relating to the
money market. If the interest rate mechanism fails for one
reason or another to clear the market for bank credit in re-
strictive phases of monetary policy, then credit rationing
will occur, but by either route the effect on demand is ob-
vious. The transmission mechanism discussed in this para-
graph is clearly not pervasive in its effect but is concentrated
on the various forms of real investment, with perhaps some
effect on expenditure on consumer durables,
3. The wealth of households has frequently been said to
be one of the determinants of both average and marginal
propensities to save and money is one of the constituents of
gross non-human wealth. To the extent that the counterpart
of the money stock is real capital formation (or government
borrowing if certain conditions are fulfilled) money is also a
component of net wealth, which has been held to have more
influence on expenditure than gross wealth, A further type
of wealth effect has become important in recent years: high
rates of inflation have reduced the real value of holdings of
bonds and deposits below desired levels and provoked in-
creases in savings flows intended to restore the real value of
household wealth  the result has been an increase in the
demand for some components of the money stock in some
countries. A similar temporary increase in savings flows
may be provoked by the monetary authorities when they
raise interest rates and produce a fall in bond and share
prices leading economic agents to feel a need to replenish
their stocks of financial assets,
2.4, The analysis so far has been conducted in terms of sig-
nals transmitted impersonally by the market, but many of
the actions of a country s monetary authorities are in the
public domain and attract publicity. If economic agents be-
lieve that such actions will have a certain effect they may ad-
just their behaviour accordingly and, in fact, make those ef-
fects more likely. If it is believed that monetary policy has
set a certain limit to the growth of nominal output, those
having some influence over cost and price changes may
adapt their behaviour so that the impact of official action on
real output is minimized, the adjustment occurring in the
rate of price increase.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/21
5, Monetary developments may have various effects on
a country s external transactions. Induced changes in real
expenditure and the price level may have an effect on the
current account of the balance of payments after a certain
delay, but for many countries the impact of interest rate
changes (or shortage of credit) on the capital account, and
particularly on movements of short term capital, will be
more important. If the authorities are indifferent to the level
of the exchange rate, then the impact on demand and the
price level of exchange rate changes induced by capital
movements may represent an important part of the trans-
mission mechanism; but if their general objectives include a
certain set (or range) of exchange rate relationships then the
scope for an autonomous monetary policy may be severely
limited, Much will depend on the existence of market
linkages between the interest rates which influence interna-
tional capital flows and those paid by the various categories
of domestic borrower.
3. Most of the mechanisms outlined in section 2 apply in
each member country, only wealth effects not being identi-
fied in some cases; but the mechanisms vary greatly be-
tween countries in relative importance and in the lags which
intervene before they become effective, mainly because of
institutional differences, The following paragraphs sum-
marize what is known both on the basis of the accumulated
experience of national authorities and on the basis of eco-
nometric research, No member country has claimed to be
able to represent the national transmission mechanism ade-
quately within a complete and detailed econometric model
of the national economy,
1. The Federal Republic of Germany
There is a substantial body of evidence indicating a close re-
lationship between the money stock and nominal GNP in
the Federal Republic. (Interest rates also influence the de-
mand for money, but interest rate elasticities have generally
been found to be lower than those identified in the USA),
This evidence is considered to give a better guide to the
medium term effects of a steady monetary expansion than
to the effects of short term fluctuations,
Studies of the effects of interest rate changes imply that
monetary factors have a directional (or selective) rather
than a pervasive effect on expenditure. According to these
studies interest rates on bank loans and bonds respond
quickly to changes in the stance of monetary policy and in
their turn have a marked effect on investment in plant and
machinery, on stockbuilding, on the building of houses to
rent and on the spending of certain public sector bodies.
The Federal authorities do not consider that they are in a
position to know at each juncture what the interest rate
should be. They do, however, consider that the medium
term development of certain monetary aggregates is clearly
related to the medium term growth of nominal GDP.
Among those aggregates the focus of attention is the stock of
central bank money because it is closely associated with the
Bundesbank.
The announcement of monetary targets is intended to have
direct effect on the behaviour of economic agents.
Whether or not adherence to an optimal rate of growth of
central bank money in the medium term produces a satisfac-
tory equilibrium in the general economy depends on factors
outside the scope of monetary policy, including the level of
wage settlements,
A change in the rate of growth of central bank money has in
general a fairly rapid effect on real GDP (0 to 3 quarters)
and a more delayed effect on prices (4 to 8 quarters).
2, France
The transmission mechanism in France differs notably from
that in the Federal Republic of Germany. In particular, the
level of interest rates  does not have a marked effect on plans
for fixed industrial investment in France  although mone-
tary conditions may influence the timing of their execution
and the effect of interest rates on housebuilding for
owner occupation only becomes evident when they reach
unusually high levels. The cost of credit does however have
some effect on borrowing by consumers (notably for the
purchase of cars) and its availability has an effect on stock-
building.
Investigations of the demand for money in France based on
data older than the oil crisis indicated that this demand was
a stable function of the price level, of interest rates and of
income (or wealth), but recent experience has shown that
these studies failed to indentify an important cyclical ele-
ment. The French authorities remain convinced that the
broadly defined money stock (M2) has an important and
pervasive effect on nominal expenditure and therefore ex-
press their intermediate objective in terms of that aggregate.
Changes in the money stock have their effects after lags
ranging between six and 15 months. The sluggish nature of
the response of the demand for bank credit to interest rates
means that the bank credit market does not clear easily, and
the authorities therefore frequently use credit ceilings in
order to achieve their objectives for the money supply,
On the other hand, interest rates and the availability of
credit at home do have a strong influence on the capital ac-
count of the balance of payments. The authorities feel able
to take advantage of this mechanism because changes in
money-market interest rates needed to avoid tensions in the
foreign exchange market have only a muted impact on the
domestic economy,
3. Italy
The linkages between the money stock and nominal expen-
diture in Italy are unstable. Bank deposits in that country
(including current accounts) yield interest and constitute an
important savings medium: the demand for money shifts
when there is a shift in the preferences of savers between
bonds and money, and such changes in preferences have
not been easy to predict in recent years. Because the money
stock includes large precautionary holdings, households
will maintain consumption expenditures when monetary
policy is restrictive by activating those holdings,
On the other hand, the flow of credit has a strong and pre-
dictable effect on stock-formation, on fixed industrial in-
vestment, and, after a longer lag, on housebuilding. Further
the authorities have a great deal of control over the supply
of credit. Restrictive official action quickly leads to a fall in
bond prices, aggravated by a perverse reaction by house-
holds who hesitate to buy bonds on a falling market. In
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(and incur capital losses) in order to make new loans, the
special financial institutions hesitate to raise new bond
finance and industrial firms hesitate to make their own
bond issues: industrial firms thus face a squeeze across the
whole range of their sources of finance. Neither the banks
nor the special institutions raise their loan rates to clear the
credit market; the mechanism which comes into play is
therefore one of informal credit rationing,
Because this very effective channel of transmission exists
the Italian authorities express their intermediate objective in
terms of the supply of credit; and because there is a high de-
gree of substitution between bank loans and bond market
finance, they express that objective in terms of global credit
of domestic origin. They are, however, aware that their ex-
pansionary actions have much less impact than their restric-
tive measures because banks hesitate to reduce their bor-
rowing and lending rates as the country moves out of reces-
sion.
In so far as monetary conditions influence real output there
will be a marked impact on the current account of the bal-
ance of payments, since the income elasticity of demand for
imports is high in Italy. Neither monetary conditions gener-
ally nor the rate of interest in particular has a noticeable ef-
fect on long term capital movements in the balance of pay-
ments, but short term interest rates have an effect on trade
credit and banking funds and through the consequent be-
haviour of the exchange rate have an impact on the rate of
inflation.
4. The United Kingdom
The evidence for a predictable influence of the money stock
on nominal expenditure in the United Kingdom has not
been very clear-cut in recent years, but the latest results do
point to a stable demand for MI. The existence of a stable
demand for broader monetary aggregates is suggested by a
study indicating that consumption of non-durables is in-
fluenced by changes in the personal sector s liquid assets.
Some progress has also been made in identifying particular
channels of transmission. Recent work on the financial en-
vironment of firms indicates that both industrial fixed in-
vestment and stock building are sensitive to the cost of capi-
tal. The demand for  housing  is greatly influenced by mone-
tary conditions, but to some extent this is due to the fact that
the building societies adapt their deposit rates rather slowly
and thus provoke wide fluctuations in the proportion of the
savings flow which passes through their intermediation.
Personal consumption has been influenced by changes in
hire purchase terms control. Monetary conditions also have
indirect effects on imports and exports, while interest rate
changes have a direct and rapid effect on net property in-
come from abroad. In overall terms, a rise in interest rates of
one percentage point may be expected to reduce GDP by
0.25 % in real terms, most of the effects occurring after a lag
of 4 to 8 quarters, with an effect on inflation (probably
achieved through higher unemployment and by influencing
inflationary expectations in the financial markets) follow-
ing after a rather longer lag.
Such a rise in interest rates would, of course, have a signifi-
cant effect on the capital account of the balance of pay-
ments and thus provoke upward pressure on the exchange
rate.
While interest rates thus play an important role in the pro-
cess by which the United Kingdom economy adapts to a
change in the monetary aggregates, those aggregates are
themselves the key variables and the United Kingdom au-
thorities therefore express the principal intermediate objec-
tive in terms of one of them (sterling M3). If, however, the
external reserves are under pressure, domestic credit may be
expanding faster than money supply in circumstances in
which it is manifestly undesirable for it to do so; this justi-
fies the attention which has been given in the United King-
dom to domestic credit expansion (DC E).
Ireland
Monetary conditions in Ireland are strongly influenced by
the existence of a fixed exchange rate relationship with the
United Kingdom. Small movements in Dublin inter-bank
interest rates can provoke large capital flows and large firms
can borrow abroad when credit is short at home. These phe-
nomena impede the transmission to the real economy of im-
pulses which the authorities may wish to be felt, but they do
not completely preclude an independent monetary policy.
Such research evidence as is currently available points to a
pervasive rather than a selective impact of monetary condi-
tions on the real economy. Recent work suggests that there
is a stable demand-for-money function, the elasticity of
broadly defined money (M3) with respect to nominal GNP
being slightly greater than unity. No significant interest rate
elasticity has been identified. These results are perhaps rein-
forced by work showing that the stock of M2 held by the pri-
vate sector is strongly related to consumption expenditure.
M2 may here be a proxy revealing the effect of wealth hold-
ings. On the other hand there is little hard evidence of any
effect of interest rates on the various forms of capital forma-
tion. The openness of the Irish economy means that there is
a strong external influence on the price level, but there re-
mains a significant sector producing non-tradeable goods
and services whose prices are theoretically open to the in-
fluence of monetary policy,
The Irish authorities have traditionally been concerned with
the growth of credit and its impact on the official external
reserves. In recent years, given the adequacy of the external
reserves and the desirability of highlighting the monetary
implications of government financing, greater attention has
been focused on the money supply rather than credit as the
intermediate objective of monetary policy, At present, how-
ever, the issue of reserve adequacy is becoming increasingly
important and monetary policy is in consequence becoming
more oriented towards the control of domestic credit.
Denmark
The demand for money seems to be a fairly stable function
of nominal income and interest rates (effective bond yield),
The elasticity estimates are with regard to nominal income
close to unity and with regard to the bond yield 0.06 in the
short run and 0.22 in the long run. As in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the United Kingdom, certain channels
of transmission have been identified, Both industrial fixed
investment and stock-holding are influenced by the bank
lending rate, and the effective bond yield exercises a consid-
erable influence over housebuilding. These interest rate ef-Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/23
fects make themselves felt after a lag of rather more than a
year.
The relative stability of the demand for money and the small
size of the elasticity with respect to interest rates, at least in
the short run, would appear to suggest that Denmark' s inter-
mediate objectives should be expressed in terms of the
broadly-defined money supply, but the existence of a con-
siderable foreign short-term debt as well as the need to re-
duce - and in the meantime to finance - a large current
account balance of payments deficit requires the authorities
to pay particular attention to the domestic counterparts of
M2 (and also to consider total credit of domestic origin) in
order to encourage Danish firms to borrow abroad. Interest
rate policy is used to achieve the same end.
7. Belgium
Studies of short term fluctuations in the liquidity of the
economy indicate that, in the case of households, (and using
a number of definitions of liquidity) there is some influence
on real expenditure after one year and on nominal expendi-
ture after two years. Expenditure by firms shows some reac-
tion to net liquidity (sector s M2 + open credits  short
term debt, as a ratio of sector s nominal expenditure) after a
delay of 4 to 5 quarters. On the other hand the expenditure
of firms responds much more rapidly, significantly and pre-
dictably to changes in their indebtedness, while households
also show some reaction to credit conditions, both through
the effect of interest rates on housebuilding and through the
effect of hire purchase regulations on consumer durable
spending. The induced changes in expenditure have an im-
portant effect on the current account of the balance of pay-
ments since the income elasticity of demand for imports is
high,
The Belgian authorities therefore consider that the linkages
of credit supply to the real economy are much stronger than
those involving either the money supply or total liquidity;
during periods of demand pull inflation and restrictive
monetary policy, they therefore express their intermediate
objectives in terms of the volume of credit given to the pri-
vate sector; the resulting financial impulses are selective in
their effects, having their initial impact on investment
(plant, machinery, stocks and housing); during periods of
sluggish economic activity and cost push inflation, they
frame their intermediate objective in terms of interest rates,
Given the openness of the Belgian economy, the level and
variations of interest rates are, however, limited by condi-
tions prevailing on foreign financial markets,
The Netherlands
One set of work in the Netherlands indicates that the effects
of monetary conditions are clear, but not very strong: an in-
crease of I point in the liquidity ratio (which is currently in
the region of 40) increases output of the company sector by
0.8 %, employment by 1.2 % and the consumer price index
by 0.3 % after 8 quarters, with very little of this effect becom-
ing apparent after 4 quarters. A reduction in the discount
rate of one percentage point has a similar effect on output
but a much smaller one on employment and prices, It ap-
pears from work on the demand for money that inclusion
among the explanatory variables of a cyclical indicator has
produced a stable function indicating a long-run real in-
come elasticity of 0.85 and an interest elasticity of 0'2.
In the Netherlands interest rate changes have a large and
rapid effect on many types of capital flow in the balance of
payments.
The available evidence goes some way to justify the adop-
tion by the Dutch authorities of an intermediate target ex-
pressed in terms of the ratio of liquidity to net national in-
come.No C 166/24 Official Journal of the European Communities
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INTRODUCI10N
1. At its meeting on 13 February 1979 the Commit-
tee of Governors of the EEC central banks invited
the working party to consider two questions:
What are the reasons for the differences between
member countries in the instruments of monetary
policy?
- Do specific difficulties arise as a result of the dif-
ferences?
2. At its meeting on 13 March 1979 the Committee
of Governors specified that:
The working party should base its study on point
4 of its mandate from the Committee of Gover-
nors and the Monetary Committee in 1974(1
Priority should therefore be given to considera-
tion of those instruments which, when used by
one country, have repercussions on another coun-
try;
studies by the working party under point 3 of its
mandate (2) should be confined to the search for
incompatibilities between EEC member countries
involving the use of monetary policy instru-
ments;
the studies should consider the importance of the
smooth functioning of the EMS, even though it
was recognized that there was limited scope for
monetary policy on its own in this context.
3. On the basis of these requests and specifications,
the working party has drawn up the present report in
three main chapters:
Chapter I presents some considerations on the
choice of monetary policy instruments; some ex-
planation of differences between the EEC coun-
tries in the instruments used are also given;
Chapter II considers in essentially theoretical
terms and with the help of simplifying assump-
tions whether differences in the use of monetary
instruments cause difficulties in general, and in
particular for the functioning of the EMS;
Chapter III presents a summary of the report and
some conclusions and recommendations with re-
gard to better coordination in the instrumental
field.
4. The present report, however, is not exhaustive
and the group is prepared to look more deeply at
questions which the Monetary Committee and the
Committee of Governors might consider to be of in-
terest in the light of their discussion on this report
and the former committee s consideration of the
working party s second report (dated 17 January
1979).
I. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CHOICE OF MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS
5. The working party took Article 9 of Council
Directive 74/121/EEC of 18 February 1974 on stabil-
ity, growth and full employment in the Commu-
nity (3) as the starting point for its consideration of
the choice of the sets of monetary policy instruments
available to member countries.
6. The working party noted that not all countries
were even now in a position to operate on all the
(I) Point 4 of the mandate stipulates that 'the group will
study the instruments required by each member country
for its monetary policy, with a view to ensuring compati-
bility between the instruments used and their conformity
to commonly defined objectives
(2) Point 3 of this mandate stipulates that ' the group will ex-
amine the conditions under which monetary policy in-
struments have been put into effect in recent years and
the results obtained. They will study how far a progres-
sive harmonization of these measures could be real-
ized'
(3) See Appendix I.
measures listed in the Article. Furthermore, the Arti-
cle did not specify the appropriate instruments, but
only instructed the Member States to provide their
monetary authorities with the instruments and power
needed to implement the measures itemized.
7. Since the formulation of the Directive in 1974
the monetary authorities in member countries have
continued to use a wide range of instruments. The cri-
teria for assessing the efficiency of these instruments
has, however, been influenced by a shift in the em-
phasis of monetary policy. Whereas priority was ori-
ginally given to instruments best suited to achieve
prompt results, medium-term objectives have pro-
gressively become more important for monetary pol-
icy, with the monetary authorities, particularly in the
major countries, aiming at steady growth in the mon-
etary aggregates. Nevertheless, prompt action might
still be required in the context of the common ex-
change rate system. In practice some countries have
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on key aggregates  for example, credit ceilings-
while others have favoured instruments such as
changes in official lending rates and measures affect-
ing bank liquidity for controlling money market con-
ditions (see Appendix 2 on the set of instruments av-
ailable in each member country). There are consider-
able differences in the type of credit ceiling and in-
struments affecting money-market conditions ad-
opted by the various countries. In selecting the instru-
ments to be used to best achieve their national objec-
tives, monetary authorities have frequently adapted
to meet current needs instruments used either at an
earlier date or in other countries.
8. It would appear that the wide-ranging differ-
ences in the choice of instruments stem mainly from
features of the environment in which monetary pol-
icy is implemented and the way monetary policies are
conceived in different countries. Four closely inter-
related factors were identified as being significant:
(a) Strategy of the monetary authorities
9. Most countries now operate on a medium-term
objective of steady monetary expansion, for example
a deceleration of monetary growth from present lev-
els or a reduction in the liquidity ratio. The use of a
credit ceiling is consistent with this approach, as is
illustrated by the example of France, but is not es-
sential, as is the case in Germany. In France the
medium-term aim is to ensure that the rate of money
supply growth does not exceed the nominal growth
rate of the economy. A credit ceiling is therefore se-
lected and fixed at such a level as to be compatible
with this objective. In effect the credit ceiling repre-
sents the limit of tolerance of the monetary authori-
ties in their medim-term strategy, In Germany the
medium-term objective is embodied in a money
supply target that is enforced by operating on money
market conditions. The differences in instruments il-
lustrated above, despite a broadly similar medium-
term strategy of the monetary authorities, stem from
fundamental differences in approach: on the one
hand a belief in the need for specific controls at the
limit of tolerance, and on the other hand a reliance
on implicit guidance ('moral suasion ) to economic
agents and on the use of the price mechanism.
10. Differences in monetary strategy are also seen
in the various responses to pressing difficulties, such
as a foreign exchange crisis. Some countries show a
readiness to respond promptly through sharp interest
rate adjustments, others prefer to take the initial
strain through changes in the level of foreign ex-
change reserves. Still others apply selective controls
to reverse, for example, the impact of leads and lags
on inflows or outflows of foreign exchange.
(b) Financial structure
11. The financial structure has considerably in-
fluenced the choice of the instruments of monetary
policy. For example, in France the authorities have
found direct controls through a credit ceiling to be
particularly effective when implementing a restric-
tive policy since by far the largest element of the
counterparts of M2  the significant monetary ag-
gregate  consists of bank lending to the non-bank
private sector. Even so, the value of credit ceilings is
confined to periods of restrictive monetary policy
and other instruments  mainly indirect ones such
as interest rate adjustments  are still required as
part of an expansionary policy.
12. In some other countries, notably Germany and
the Netherlands, banks' balance sheets also comprise
a sizeable volume of non-monetary liabilities. The
tightening. of money market conditions in Germany
aims not only to slow down the expansion of bank
credit through higher bank lending rates but also to
bring about shifts from monetary to non-monetary
liabilities through changes in relative interest rates. In
the Netherlands, these shifts are brought about by the
use of a net credit ceiling.
13. Another example is the Supplementary Special
Deposits Scheme ('corset') which was introduced in
the United Kingdom in 1973 to limit the banks' abil-
ity to manage their liabilities, since they had tended
to react perversely to a tightening of monetary policy
by bidding more aggressively for deposits. Such a
scheme is particularly relevant where the liabilities of
the sector to which it applies or can be applied are the
main constituent of the monetary aggregates chosen
as an intermediate target  as is the case in the
United Kingdom.
(c) Institutional differences
14. In some countries the monetary authorities do
not have at their disposal the legal powers to use par-
ticular instruments, for example credit ceilings. In
some cases this may have to be regarded as a long-
term factor since the lack of such instruments reflects
basis policy principles associated with institutional
arrangements and the economic system. Important
considerations in this context are the relationship be-
tween the government and the central bank and the
competition and allocational effects accompanying
the use of particular sets of instruments.
(d) Wider economic considerations
15. Several considerations concerning the wider
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affect the choice of the monetary authorities. In order
to retain some autonomy of monetary policy, a pre-
ference has been shown, especially by small open
economies participating in a stable exchange rate sys-
tem and where interest rate policy is constrained by
external considerations, for the use of credit ceilings
in conjunction with some capital controls. The very
size of exogenous impulses which monetary policy
has to cope with  such as the past level of inflation
or the size of the government deficit - may also in-
duce the monetary authorities to supplement money-
market instruments with administrative controls.
16. The reluctance in some countries  France, for
example  to resort to sharp upward adjustments in
interest rates, and hence the recourse to credit ceil-
ings instead, reflects  inter alia  concern over the pro-
blem of banks' transformation rates. Where banks
are dependent on short-term liabilities, but their as-
sets are of longer maturity, there is a danger that vola-
tile interest rates, and especially sizeable increases,
could undermine the stability of some banks.
17. Whereas the foregoing arguments tend to sup-
port the use of gross credit ceilings, in particular in
countries where sole reliance on the interest rate me-
chanism would lead to very high bank lending rates,
it was noted that such controls also impede the free
operation of competition between banks, leading to
distortions in the distribution of credit and in the
price of corporate financing (allocation effect). These
considerations have led some monetary authorities to
favour reliance on interest rate mechanisms as the
principal channel of monetary control. Other autho-
rities only use gross credit ceilings in an emergency,
tolerating domestic side-effects (e.g. the difficulties
created for small enterprises by a sharp squeeze). Still
other authorities believe that these undesirable side-
effects can be avoided through selective credit ceil-
ings or net credit ceilings since the latter will leave the
availability of credit unchanged and give small enter-
prises access to capital market finance through their
banks (see paragraph 21 below).
II. DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE CHOICE OF DIFFERENT MONETARY
INSTRUMENTS
1. IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF DIF-
FICULTIES
18. In order to identify difficulties arising from dif-
ferences in the choice of monetary policy instru-
ments, the working party studied price (interest rate)
and availability effects of three alternative instru-
mental approaches as well as the response of capital
flows to these effects. The three alternative ap-
proaches, which have been simplified (1) to assist the
analysis, are:
the indirect control of a monetary or credit aggre-
gate (approach a),
a gross credit ceiling (approach b),
a net credit ceiling (approach c).
19.  Approach a:  the central bank operates on
money market conditions. This is done by the use of
open-market policy, modification of compulsory re-
serve rations and re-discount ceilings and manipula-
tion of official lending rates.
20.  Approach b:  the growth rate of all bank credits
to residents is limited by a ceiling (2).
(I) For this reason, these instrumental approaches are not
identical with current national approaches.
21.  Approach c:  a net credit ceiling scheme where
the restrictions apply only to the growth of bank
credits financed from monetary resources; for exam-
ple, in the Netherlands there is no limit on gross
credit expansion as such, to the extent that banks can
finance lending by increasing their long-term
nonmonetary liabilities (2).
22. The interest rate and availability effects of these
three alternative instrumental approaches were ex-
amined in the case of a tightening of monetary policy
because alternatives band c are essentially restrictive
instruments, even if in practice they often remain in
force when monetary policy is not restrictive.
23. To facilitate the analysis in paragraphs 24 to 29
certain simplifying assumptions were made:
that three countries (A, B, C), using the alterna-
tive approaches, participate in an exchange rate
system such as the EMS and that the system as a
whole is in equilibrium;
that the developments in the different countries
have no impact on interest rates outside the com-
mon exchange rate system;
(2) Credit ceilings (gross and net) were taken as applying to
all credit, both in domestic and foreign currencies, to
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that capital controls are not considered as possi-
ble instruments;
that exchange rate expectations will remain un-
changed.
While these simplifying assumptions were needed in
order to isolate possible difficulties due to the choice
of instruments it should be kept in mind that funda-
mental economic differences and exchange rate ex-
pectations will often exert a much stronger influence
on international capital movements. In fact the sensi-
tivity of present-day exchange markets is such that
any new information which seems to indicate a
change in economic performance, or in the stance of
economic policy, is rapidly incorporated into expec-
tions and reflected in capital flows. For example, in
the case of foreign exchange crises, exchange rate ex-
pectations may thus build up to such an extent that
the more normal availability and price effects of the
different instrumental approaches may either be re-
versed, offset or accentuated. Another example
which has not been taken into consideration in the
~nalysis is the announcement effect of monetary pol-
ICY measures.
(a) Price and availability effects of alternative instru-
mental approaches
24. In approach a, the tightening of money market
conditions will spread to other interest rates in the
economy even if the size of interest rate changes is
not precisely predictable as market forces can offset
or accentuate the impact of tightened money market
conditions. Subject to this reservation, bank lending
rates will normally increase. At the same time, depos-
it rates, especially rates on large deposits, will also
rise; in countries where the banks' balance sheets also
include a sizeable volume of non-monetary liabilities
there will be a shift from sight deposits (which are
normally non-interest bearing) and finally short-term
deposits to longer term deposits and bank bonds not
included in money supply. Furthermore, a tightening
of money market conditions will also affect capital
market rates especially if banks in the short term re-
duce their purchases of securities rather than their
direct lending.
25. Instrumental approach a, however, works not
only through price effects; it may also have a certain
availability effect in so far as the message conveyed
by the central bank's action leads the banking system
to assess the risks on its lending more cautiously and
subsequently to tighten its criteria for the selection of
borrowers. The greater this effect the smaller the in-
terest rate changes needed to slow down the expan-
sion of bank lending. On the other hand, the size of
the necessary interest rate rise is also a function of the
time horizon of the monetary authorities. The more
rapidly they want to bring monetary growth back to
its desired path, the more drastic the tightening of
money market conditions has to be.
26. Approach b relies mainly on availability effects.
As the central bank does not act on money market
conditions and therefore the refinancing cost to the
banking system will not change immediately, initially
there is little incentive for banks to raise lending
rates. Instead, the banks may ration credit either by
allocating selectively the reduced credit available or
by reducing proportionally customers' borrowings.
Nevertheless, the imposition of the credit ceiling may
also have a price effect if banks use the method of
pricing out excess demand. The experience of coun-
tries which have used gross credit ceilings shows that
all these kinds of bahaviour can be observed al-
though the relative importance varies from country
to country. Since in the case of approach b banks' li-
quidity will undergo no change, capital market rates
will in general not be affected initially by a tightening
of monetary policy. There may even be a fall in these
rates as banks place in the market the liquid funds
they cannot lend because of the credit ceilings. In the
longer term, however, this tendency is reversed as the
corporate sector increases its recourse to the capital
market, but this necessitates some substitutability be-
tween bonds and bank loans.
27. The functioning of approach c has much in
common with that of approach a in its effects 
bank lending and capital market rates. In the N ether-
lands, for example, banks may expand gross credit
without limit as long as they cover the excess over the
net credit ceiling percentage by a corresponding in-
crease of their non-monetary liabilities. Conse-
quently they are encouraged to bid aggressively for
non-monetary funds, i.e. long-term deposits, savings
deposits and funds from the bond market, pushing
up longer term interest rates. The interest rate struc-
ture will be changed in favour of long term assets
held with the banking system and this will tend to
slow down the growth rate of liquid holdings by the
economy. Unlike approach a, approach c does not
imply a tightening of money market conditions and
therefore has less impact on banks' funding costs and
subsequently on their lending rates.
(b) Circumvention of monetary policies by the busi-
ness sector
28. In the case of all three approaches a tightening
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interest rate and availability effects of these policies
by the business sector. Two possibilities are offered to
the business sector: to borrow abroad (which in cer-
tain cases is in fact an aim of the authorities) or from
other domestic financial sources.
29. The incentive to borrow abroad will be particu-
larly strong in the case of approach b where availabil-
ity effects are predominant. Credit demand will be
inelastic, especially in the short run, and the bor-
rower may be forced to accept the going foreign in-
terest rate as well as the exchange rate risks involved.
Furthermore, banks which see the expansion of their
lending activity restricted by the existence of credit
ceilings may help their customers in borrowing
abroad by granting them credits through their foreign
branches and by issuing guarantees in their favour.
30. The price effect of approach a will also provoke
borrowing abroad by enterprises but increased lend-
ing rates will provide an incentive to borrow abroad
only if the interest rate differential between domestic
and foreign interest rates is substantial since enter-
prises may be reluctant to break the relationship with
their domestic banks and to accept an exchange risk
because of only a small or temporary difference in
the cost of borrowing. In approach c the increase in
lending rates is smaller, so the incentive to borrow
abroad will also be small.
31. The recourse by enterprises to domestic finan-
cial sources other than bank credit (financial disinter-
mediation) will occur mainly in approach b. The
characteristics of financial structure will also playa
determinant role in the process of exhausting other
existing financial sources (for example commercial
credit, borrowing from insurance and pension funds)
and of establishing new parallel markets (for exam-
ple direct lending between enterprises). In general
such new markets will only develop if restrictions on
credit actually bite for a long time. The size of finan-
cial disintermediation, however, will also depend on
whether there are substantial imbalances in indi-
vidual and sectoral liquidity positions.
( c)  Response of capital flows to the price and availa-
bility effects of alternative instrumental ap-
proaches
32. Section b shows that in all three cases restrictive
monetary policies will induce capital inflows via the
domestic business sector, appearing either in the
capital balance or as leads and lags. For the reasons
given earlier, the incentive to such capital flows may
be stronger in the case of approach b than in the other
cases unless the price effect is substantial.
33. With regard to external capital transactions of
other sectors of the economy, the differences between
the instrumental approaches are more marked. Un-
der the condition of full interdependence of capital
markets, the rise in capital market rates resulting
from the use of approaches a and c will attract finan-
cial investments by non-residents, whereas this will
not occur in the case of approach b unless the rele-
vant rates show a tendency to rise following the
abovementioned attempts by the business sector
to circumvent restrictions on bank lending.
34. As far as banks' foreign transactions are con-
cerned, instrumental approaches of types a and c give
rise to short-term and long-term capital imports by
the banks. When credit ceilings of type b are in oper-
ation, the banking system may even be inclined to in-
vest abroad the funds which cannot be used for its
lending activity, unless specific rules are applied to
the banks' foreign position.
35. The sensitivity of capital flows to price and
availability effects will, however, be reduced by ob-
stacles to free capital movements. Despite an interna-
tional interest rate differential, non-residents may
not invest on a particular capital market if the assets
offered on this market are not suitable for them.
There are also dicriminatory measures which prevent
foreigners from buying bonds issued on domestic
capital markets.
36. Regulations applying to the foreign positions of
the banking system are in force which would, in the
case of approach b, prevent banks from exporting
capital. Capital imports by banks can be prohibited
or made relatively unattractive in various ways e.
fixing very high or 100% reserve requirements on the
increase of banks' foreign liabilities; banning the sale
of bank bonds to non-residents; defining a net credit
ceiling so that borrowing abroad of monetary and
non-monetary liabilities cannot be deducted, as is the
case in the Netherlands.
37. In all three cases capital inflows are stimulated
but the lags involved for capital flows to react to the
various approaches are, however, different, as are the
channels through which the capital flows. In ap-
proach a non-residents will react promptly to
changed money market conditions, resulting imme-
diately in capital inflows via the banking system. In
approach c, where inflows will principally take the
form of purchases of capital market instruments, the
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tional interdependence of capital markets is less per-
fect than that of money markets~ In approach b the
availability effect will bite on residents more than the
price effect (Le. increase in bank lending rates) of ap-
proaches a and c, and capital inflows will go mainly
to the non-bank private sector. The magnitude of
these effects will depend, however, on the specific
economic conditions in which the various ap-
proaches are adopted; the response will therefore not
be the same in all countries.
38. In the interest of ensuring the smooth function-
ing of the common exchange rate system a major
question will also be the extent to which the capital
flows described above will occur between the mem-
ber countries themselves or between each of them
and the rest of the world. If all three countries tighten
their monetary policy, and if this action has no im-
pact on the monetary situation in the rest of the
world, capital inflows via the business sector may
stem essentially from the rest of the world. Enter-
prises in country B will not borrow in countries A
and C but rather on markets outside the common ex-
change rate system, where borrowing costs are lower.
On the other hand, enterprises in countries A and C
will not borrow from banks in country B as lending
rates are higher than on third markets and as the ris-
ing trend in the exchange rates of jointly floating cur-
rencies  vis-a-vis  the rest of the world may give an in-
centive to borrow on third markets.
39. The induced differentials in money market rates
(countries Band C  vis-a-vis  country A) and in capital
market rates (country B against countries A and C)
would, however, entail a shift in financial investment
and result  to the extent that the abovementioned
obstacles to capital flows will be surmounted 
some capital outflows from countries Band C respec-
tively. Shifts in financial investment from the rest of
the common exchange rate system will also tend to-
wards country A. Thus countries Band C will have to
tolerate an upward adjustment of money and capital
rates or incur reserve losses to keep their currencies
within the fixed margins with country A. If the poli-
cies in Band C aim at maintaining low interest rates
this change in stance would be an example of a harm-
ful side effect for these countries stemming from in-
strumental differences.
2. POSSIBILITIES OF AVOIDING DETRIMENTAL
SIDE EFFECTS ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF CERTAIN
INSTRUMENTS
40. One of the questions which were examined in
this context was whether a net or gross credit ceiling
could be used, for a short period, to avoid the in-
crease in domestic ~hort-term interest rates deriving
- from instrumental approach a and possibly causing
difficulties for neighbouring countries in a fixed ex-
change rate system. To this end, a gross credit ceiling
would have to be operated in such a way that its
availability effect does not lead to capital inflows.
Since a net credit ceiling does not have such an avai-
lability effect it does not have the same drawback.
41. The group examined whether the avoidance of
capital inflows could be achieved without having re-
course to capital control measures if the monetary
authorities extend the credit ceiling to credits granted
by banks' foreign branches and to  guarantees en-
abling or facilitating borrowing abroad by resi-
dents.
42. It came to the conclusion that the efficiency of
these measures would be subject to the extent to
which residents depend on cooperation of the domes-
tic banking system when borrowing abroad; if the
business sector is integrated in the international mar-
kets, then such measures will at best only block a part
of the foreign funds, and the need for capital controls
will persist. Such controls have been seen to be far
from efficient and raise various problems at a na-
tional and Community level. The extension of capital
controls would conflict with the obligation arising
under the Treaty of Rome(l) and with the move to-
wards stronger monetary and economic integra-
tion.
(I) Article 67 states that: ' Member States shall progressively
abolish between themselves all restrictions on the move-
ment of capital belonging to persons resident in Mem-
ber States and any discrimination based on the
nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or
on the place where such capital is invested,Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/31
III. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
43. The working party noted that the criteria on
which the efficiency of monetary policy is judged
have been influenced by the shift in the emphasis of
monetary management in member countries in the
recent past: from a prompt, short-run type of action
(still retained in cases of emergency) to a more
medium-term orientation of monetary policy. Four
factors were identified as being significant in ex-
plaining the differences between member countries
in the instruments of monetary policy: the strategy of
the monetary authorities, the financial structure, the
institutional set-up and considerations concerning
the wider economic implications of using certain in-
struments. In practice, countries have in general
shown preference either for instruments which oper-
ate directly on key aggregates - e.g. credit ceilings 
or for 'indirect' instruments, such as the manipula-
tion of money market conditions, or for a combina-
tion of both.
44. In order to identify the possible difficulties aris-
ing from differences in the choice of monetary policy
instruments, the working party studied in a model the
price (Le. interest rate) and availability effects of
three alternative instrumental approaches adopted
simultaneously in three countries, as well as the
response of capital flows to these effects. The three
approaches examined were the indirect control of
monetary or credit aggregates through the control of
money market conditions, the use of a gross credit
ceiling and that of a net credit ceiling (see paragraphs
19 to 21).
45. In accordance with its mandate, the working
party concentrated on interest rate and availability
effects of three instrumental approaches. It noted
that capital flows are induced not only by interest
rate differentials or by availability effects, but also
respond to market perception of the basic factors af-
fecting exchange rate expectations. Any difficulties
which the use of different monetary policy instru-
ments might possibly cause are hard to distinguish
from the difficulties arising from the persisting differ-
ences between Member States in economic perfor-
mance and in the priorities of economic policy as
well as from external shocks to the Community s ex-
change rate system. Basic factors might, however, be
accentuated in the short-term by instrumental differ-
ences.
46. The working party agreed that the three instru-
mental approaches differ in the relative importance
of their price and availability effects: availability ef-
fects are especially marked in the case of a gross
credit ceiling system, whereas net credit ceilings and
indirect instruments differ especially with regard to
their impact on money market conditions. In all three
cases capital inflows are stimulated, but the lags in-
volved for capital flows to react to the various ap-
proaches are different, as are the channels through
which the capital flows. In approach a non-residents
will react promptly to changed money market condi-
tions, resulting immediately in capital inflows via the
banking system. In approach c, where inflows will
principally take the form of purchases of capital mar-
ket instruments, the time lag will be longer, assuming
that the international interdependence of capital
markets is less perfect than that of money markets. In
approach b the availability effect will bite on resi-
dents more than the price effect (i.e. increase in bank
lending rates) of approaches a and c, and capital in-
flows will go mainly to the non-bank private sector.
The magnitude of these effects will depend, however
on the specific economic conditions in which the var-
ious approaches are adopted; the response will there-
fore not be the same in all countries. The working
party therefore concluded that whereas the relative
size of capital flows induced by the three instrumen-
tal approaches cannot be determined in advance, the
disturbing effects on other Community countries re-
sulting from one approach may be more serious than
if another approach is selected.
47. In a country with an appreciating currency a
gross credit ceiling would help to reduce the inflow
through the banking sector but would entail in-
creased capital inflows through the business sector.
For a gross credit ceiling to be effective, capital con-
trols or other specific regulations would have to be
imposed. Capital control measures, however, would
raise various problems at a national and Community
level and other disincentives have not been very ef-
fective. On the other hand, a net credit ceiling which
does not have such an availability effect would have
to be defined in such a way as to avoid induced capi-
tal inflows through the capital market.
48. The working party finally noted that possible
difficulties might stem not only from differences in
the instruments of monetary policy, but also from
those in the timing and intensity of their use, espe-
cially given the announcement effect of monetary
measures on exchange rate expectations. Even if
identical instruments are used, the result may be very
different if one country reacts sharply to undesired
monetary and economic developments while another
one prefers a more flexible approach. The working
party therefore thought it important that, when con-
sidering major monetary actions, each country
should take account of the likely impact on neigh-No C 166/32 Official Journal of the European Communities
bouring countries of the alternative instruments
available to it. In particular, countries should assess
the consequences of the envisaged monetary action
for the smooth functioning of the EMS. Problems of
timing and principle can make prior consultations on
specific changes in instruments difficult. But policy
consultations concerning monetary policy develop-
ments generally  in particular discussion of the past
impact of such changes and consideration of possible
future effects  in the relevant Community fora can
lead to an improved understanding of the policy re-
quirements and financial structures of neighbouring
countries. Greater understanding of the different ef-
fects of particular instruments would mean that po-
tentially harmful effects on neighbouring countries
could also be avoided, or at least mitigated. More
over, it could increase the efficiency in domestic
terms of monetary policies pursued in the different
EEC member countries by avoiding tensions in the
common exchange rate system. In fact, such tensions
generally are an obstacle for all participating coun-
tries to achieve their monetary policy objectives.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/33
APPENDIX J
COUNCIL DIRECfIVE 74/12IIEEC OF 18 FEBRUARY 1974 ON STABILITY,
GROWTH AND FULL EMPLOYMENT IN THE COMMUNITY
Article 
Member States shall take the measures necessary to enable them to take prompt action on the var-
ious elements covered by the policy of the monetary authorities, particularly money supply, bank
liquidity, credit and interest rates.
For this purpose, Member States shall confer upon their monetary authorities, in so far as the latter
do not already have them, at least the instruments and powers to enable them to apply, where
necessary, the foBowing measures:
imposition or modification of reserve rations applying to the liabilities of monetary institu-
tions;
imposition or modification of reserve ratios applying to the credit granted by monetary institu-
tions;
recourse to an open market policy with wide scope for action, including the use, as necessary, of
short-, medium- and long-term securities;
modification of the re-discount ceilings with the central bank;
modification of the various interventions rates practised by the monetary authorities.
In addition, the monetary authorities shall, as far as possible, be invested with the instruments and
powers enabling them to implement the foB owing measures:
modification of the borrowing and lending interest rates paid or charged by public credit agen-
CIes;
imposition or modification of conditions for consumer credit, hire-purchase sales and mort-
gage credit;
quantitative or qualitative credit control.'No C 166/34 Official Journal of the European Communities
APPENDIX 
THE INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY IN MEMBER COUNTRIES
For homogeneity and comparability, the instruments have
been classified into four categories:
(i) Instruments through which the authorities supply the
markets with central bank money: open market opera-
tions, re-discounting, advances and swaps. Open mar-
ket operations, unlike re-discounting and advances, af-
fect the 'non-borrowed' reserves of the banks. However
as an OECD publication(l) observes: 'the distinction
between the effects of the two instruments must not be
overdone; there are forms of open market operations
which do not differ significantly from changes in cen-
tral bank lending
(ii) Compulsory reserves on deposits by and credit to resi-
dents.
(iii) Measures directly affecting bank assets or liabilities:
(a) measures aimed at directly limiting the expansion
of banks' balance-sheet items: 'encadrement' , the
corset' ;
(b) measures which oblige banks to affect part of their
resources in favour of certain aims: minimum hold-
ings of securities, qualitative or selective guid-
ance.
The two measures are often combined: quantitative
credit controls have, for example, been often used on a
selective basis.
(iv) The control of external operations, particularly from
the point of view of their impact on liquidity,
BELGIUM
I. The central bank supplies the banks with central bank
money through re-discounting operations and advances.
There is a re-discount ceiling, and its variation is an impor-
tant monetary policy instrument. Rates under re-discount
ceiling 'A' are at times different from rates under ceiling '
and also differ according to whether the advances are
granted within the monthly quotas or outside them.
2. Compulsory reserves are imposed only during periods
of restriction; the coefficients are fairly low.
3. Quantitative credit control measures are applied during
periods of restriction, usually for a short time. The last time
controls were applied they lasted for only three months,
from October to December 1978. The controls were highly
selective, and their main purpose was to protect the Belgian
franc. The 1975 controls included compulsory penalty re-
serves if limits were exceeded.
(1) OECD 
- '
The role of monetary policy in demand management'
Paris 1975, p. 29.
Minimum holding of securities representing the national
debt is an important monetary policy instrument; it enables
the treasury to 'obtain financing from sources other than the
central bank, and thus to avoid an excessive expansion of
bank liquidity,
4, Regulation of the banks' external position.
DENMARK
1, The banks have access to borrowing from the central
bank under a system of borrowing limits. This system was
introduced in 1975 replacing various traditional borrowing
facilities. The limits are fixed quarterly as a percentage of
each bank' s capital and reserves, and indicate the average
amount that may be borrowed in the quarter. The facility is
divided into three (from April 1979 into two) brackets to
which ascending rates of interest are applied. In addition
the Nationalbank has occasionally supplied overnight
funds via the money market when the banks' borrowing re-
quirements exceeded the level foreseen when the borrowing
limits were fixed. The central bank also offers the banks a
deposit facility, so far within an average amount of 5 % of
the bank' s capital and reserves. Interest is paid correspond-
ing to discount rate minus 3 %. Central bank deposit certifi-
cates at three, six and nine months are issued when neces-
sary to mop up excess liquidity. They have not been issued
since 1976.
2. There is no permanent fractional reserve requirement.
Special deposits were called in 1975 and 1976 in order to ab-
sorb excess bank liquidity. The deposits were released in
1977.
3, Credit commitments by banks and savings banks have
been subject to quantitative controls since 1970.
4. The banks are required to keep their net external posi-
tion (net claims on correspondents, etc.) within a net asset
position corresponding to 15 % of capital and reserves and a
net liability position corresponding to 5 % of capital and re-
serves. The banks are occasionally permitted to hold foreign
exchange exceeding the upper limit in cover of forward lia-
bilities. From 1972 to 1976 the central bank occasionally in-
tervened in the forward market for foreign exchange.
GERMANY
I. The market is supplied with central bank money
through re-discounting, 'Lombard' advances , domestic
open market operations and, occasionally, special transac-
tions in the exchange market. Quantitative ceilings are
placed on banks' re-discount facilities at the central bank,
while 'Lombard' credit serves essentially as a temporary
source of funds. Interventions in the bond market have been
sporadic. The Bundesbank has an ancillary instrument for
influencing bank liquidity at its disposal, in that it can in-Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/35
fluence the way in which cash surpluses of the central gov-
ernment are distributed between the central bank and the
commercial banks,
2. The compulsory reserve system represents a very impor-
tant policy instrument in Germany. Coefficients are often
adjusted to influence the current level of bank liquidity,
vary banks' dependence on Bundesbank assistance as they
expand their earning assets, and change the cost of banking
funds, These coefficients vary according to the importance
of the credit institutions concerned. On 31 March 1979, the
coefficients were about 13 %, 9'5 % and 6.5% respectively
for  sight deposits, time deposits and savings deposits. The
highest figures ever recorded for these coefficients are about
20 %, 14 % and 9 % for resident holdings of sight, time and
savings deposits respectively. Compulsory reserves do not
bear interest.
3. In 1970 reserve requirements were applied for several
months on the increase in liabilities (40 % for sight and time
deposits and 20 % for savings deposits).
4. To ward off capital inflows, differential reserve ratios
have, at times, been applied  for  resident and non-resident
deposits. Legal maximum reserve ratios are fixed at 30 %
20 % and 10% for resident holdings of sight, time and sav-
ings deposits respectively, while reserve requirements on
non-resident deposits can be raised up to 100 %. The Exter-
nal trade and payments act and supplementary regulations
enable the Federal Government to place restrictions on
capital movements, the payment of interest on non-resident
deposits, and impose a reserve requirement (non-interest
bearing 'Bardepot' holdings with the Bundesbank) on non-
bank foreign borrowing. The Federal Government must act
in consultation with the Bundesbank, and the latter issues
authorizations and determines 'Bardepot' ratios respec-
tively in agreement with the Federal Ministry responsible.
FRANCE
1. There are two types of open market operations; (a) invi-
tations to tender ('appels d'offres ) against commercial
paper (short-term, negotiable with the Banque de France),
with varying frequency in the course of a month (one to
three calls per month); and (b) open window operations on
a sale-and-repurchase basis ('pensions ) of treasury bills
held on current account or of medium-term certificates is-
sued by the Credit Foncier de France and the Credit Na-
tional.
There has been no re-discounting at the official bank rate
since 1971, except for medium-term credits for exports to
the EEC (FF 2 000 million at the beginning of 1979) during
exceptional periods when the money market rate was higher
than the official rate. However, open-window operations in-
volving large amounts take place at preferential rates with
the mobilization of medium-term foreign claims on non-
Community debtors.
2, A system of ordinary compulsory reserves at constant
rates against banks' liabilities is applied: at present , 4 %
against residents' sight deposits, 0 % against savings depo-
sits (time deposits, savings accounts etc.), Highest past rates
were 17 % on sight deposits and 7 % on savings deposits, in
1974; the maximum reserve ratio against liabilities author-
ized by the Conseil national du credit is 25 %, Compulsory
reserves at constant rates against credits distributed by
banks and financial institutions, deducting credit not sub-
ject to controls (see below), are also required. At present, the
rate is 0.5 % of the total amount distributed; the highest past
rate was 33 % of the increase in credit distributed; the maxi-
mum reserve ratio against credits authorized by the Conseil
national du credit is 50 
Ordinary compulsory reserves are not directly used for con-
trolling monetary creation by the banks. Their main pur-
pose is to weigh on bank liquidity, by obliging banks either
to maintain central bank refinancing at the same level 
particularly by sterilizing the increase in their liquidity due
to an inflow offoreign currency, as in September 1978 - or
to have increasing recourse to such refinancing, The re-
serves act through the banks' accounts on the rates effec-
tively charged to borrowers.
3, Banks whose credit growth rate exceeds the norms fixed
by the authorities are required, as a penalty, to place 'sup-
plementary reserves' with the Banque de France. The ratio
for  such reserves is steeply progressive the further outstand-
ing credit is in excess of the recommended norms, and is ap-
plied against the total amount of outstanding credit subject
to controls, thus acting as a strong disincentive to exceeding
the limits. Since the beginning of 1979, the norms have been
set for a six-month period; they furthermore are differen-
tiated according to the size of the institution concerned. For
each bank, the basis  for  calculating the supplementary re-
serves is obtained by deducting from the total amount of
outstanding credit subject to the requirement:
(i) any changes in own funds and bond issues;
(ii) the difference between the amount of credit authorized
and the amount granted over the previous six months
(carrying over of unused potential credit),
It should be noted that a quarter of the credit granted by
banks and financial establishments (export credits, subsi-
dized housing, certain investment credits and so on) is
exempt from the supplementary reserves requirement. How-
ever, a percentage of the increase in credit in these
exempted categories (except  for  the increase in advances in
foreign currency) has been included in the basis  for  calcu-
lating credit subject to upper limits, so as to increase control
over total credit. The percentage included was 15 % in 1978;
it is 20 % in 1979.
There also is a minimum required holding known as the
minimum portfolio of medium-term claims and bonds , the
latter with less than seven years to maturity. At present, the
minimum holding must represent 7 % of the liabilities used
as a basis for calculating ordinary reserves; the maximum
rate authorized by the Conseil national du credit is 25 
4. Banks may not present a net foreign exchange position
nor may they lend French francs to non-residents (except
for  buyer' credits). Ordinary compulsory reserves against
deposits by non-residents may be applied. In 1973, these re-
serves were 100 % of the increase in such liabilities since the
beginning of the year, the maximum authorized by the Con-
seil national du credit, but the requirement was suspended
in 1974.No C 166/36 Official Journal of the European Communities
IRELAND ITALY
1. The banks are supplied with liquidity through tempo-
rary re-discounting of exchequer bills and agricultural com-
modities intervention bills and by temporary advances
against the security of government stocks. The cost of resort
to the central bank is varied as a function of market interest
rates and the rate of growth of private sector credit. The
main source of liquidity in recent years to the banks has
been the change in official external reserves, which also re-
flected government borrowing abroad.
2. A system of primary and secondary liquidity ratio re-
quirements is operated by the central bank. Primary liquid
assets comprise the sum of a bank' s holdings of notes and
coins and balances with the central bank (including reserve
bonds and statutory deposits), while secondary liquid assets
comprise a bank' s holdings of government paper (including
exchequer bills and re-discounts) ; relevant resources com-
prise  the sum of a bank's current and deposit accounts and
net external liability (adjusted for any exemptions that have
been granted by the central bank), less balances with and
lending to all other licensed banks within the State. The pri-
mary liquidity ratio is the ratio of primary liquid assets to
relevant resources. The current minimum prescribed ratio is
13 % for associated banks, North American banks, mer-
chant banks and industrial banks and 10% for the category
Other banks , The secondary liquidity ratio is the ratio of
secondary assets to relevant resources: the current mini-
mum prescribed ratio is 30 % for associated banks and 10 
for all other licensed banks. The levels of the ratios have not
been changed very frequently.
3. Quantitative credit controls were suspended in 1972
when liquidity ratios were introduced. Direct credit controls
were subsequently reintroduced and in March 1979 the cen-
tral bank issued a guideline providing for an 18 % increase
between February 1979 and February 1980 in bank lending
to the private sector(l). Provision is made to secure the at-
tainment of this guideline by requiring individual banks
with excessive rates of increases in credit during the period
to place supplementary deposits at the central bank at non-
remunerative rates of interest.
4, Since February 1979 there is no monetary policy limita-
tion(2) on domestic lending by banks denominated in for-
eign currencies and funded by capital inflows through
banks; any increase in such lending is excluded from the
credit guideline. Forward cover facilities are available in
respect of external borrowings that are directly related to
trade. Individual banks' open positions in foreign curren-
cies are controlled and there is also a limit on the extent to
which a bank may hold spot foreign assets against forward
liabilities in foreign currencies.
(1) The private sector is defined for this purpose to include State
bodies and local authorities.
(2) Exchange control approval is required and is usually granted for
borrowing for productive purposes.
I. Controls of the amount of monetary base creation
through:
(a) open market operations in long- and short-term govern-
ment securities, both on the new issues and secondary
market;
(b) refinancing of commercial banks with:
(i) ordinary advances, subject to a ceiling, and
(ii) special advances and re-discounting, penalty rates
are applied to banks which use these operations in
excess of certain limits;
(c) regulation of the banks' net external position.
2, Controls over the uses of monetary base through:
(a) changes in the coefficient of compulsory reserves to be
held in base money against deposits. Since February
1975, compulsory reserves have represented 15.75 % of
the increase in current and saving deposits;
(b) the import deposits scheme, first introduced in 1974
and, in a revised version, again in 1976, according to
which non-interest-bearing deposits, equal to a certain
percentage of the value of imports, had to be held for a
certain period with the central bank.
3. Control of securities issues, which require official per-
mission by the Interministerial Committee on credit and
saving (CICR).
4. Direct credit controls in the form of:
(a) 'floors' on securities investments, first introduced in
1973 and asking banks to invest a fixed proportion of
the increase in deposits during the reference (at present
6.5 %), in certain types of securities;
(b) 'ceilings' on the expansion of bank loans, introduced in
1973 with selective purposes and then used as tool for
controlling both the amount and the composition of
bank credit. At present they are set on a rolling basis at
12 or six months' intervals,
THE NETHERLANDS
I. Recourse to the central bank can take the form of re-
discounting of eligible paper or of advances. Recourse at of-
ficial rates is restricted to limits which are set for periods of
normally about three months. Recourse exceeding these
limits is in principle not allowed and granted only against
penalty rates of interest.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 166/37
The central bank can affect money market conditions
through :
(a) (temporary) easing actions:
1. granting of special loans;
2. open market purchases of treasury paper (not used
since 1971);
3, Purchases of dollars under resale agreements
(swaps).
(b) (temporary) tightening actions:
I. cash reserves;
2. open market sales of treasury paper (portfolio zero
since 1971);
3. sales of dollars under repurchase agreements
(swaps).
2. A system of liquidity reserve requirements was intro-
duced in 1973. The system comprises two reserve require-
ments, one against long-term and one against short-term lia-
bilities ofthe banks. The former is in principle constant: the
latter may be varied in order to affect the level of free liquid
reserves. Reserve assets according to the system are claims
on the central bank and  mainly  treasury paper. The
system can be applied in a merely accompanying manner
(light phase, in which a free margin of liquid reserves is
maintained) and in a restrictive manner (severe phase, in
which the free margin becomes negative), The severe phase
has up till now never been applied. In view of the prolonged
application of direct credit restrictions, both reserve re-
quirements have been lowered to two-thirds of their former
level (of 6 and 10.5 % respectively), effective April 1978.
3. The central bank is entitled to apply direct credit con-
trols. Such a system was introduced in May 1977. At present
a net system is in force: it applies to the increase in short-
term credit to the private sector and long-term credit, as far
as these are not financed by long-term non-monetary liabili-
ties (reserves, capital market borrowing, deposits of two
years or longer, (genuine) savings deposits). This means that
there is no limit on gross credit expansion as such: the con-
trols apply only to credit financed from monetary resources.
Banks exceeding the credit restriction can be obliged to
place non-interest bearing deposits with the central bank.
For 1979 the net credit ceiling is 8 % for each individual
bank: in addition an allowance of in total I % of net credit
was distributed among smaller banks.
4. Regulation of the banks' net external position: in prin-
ciple no net foreign liabilities allowed.
UNITED KINGOM
I. The monetary authorities seek to influence short-term
interest rates and bank liquidity through open market oper-
ations. These operations are carried out via the discount
market rather than with the commercial banks directly. In
general, the Bank mops up a surplus of funds in the market
by selling treasury bills and meets a shortage by buying
treasury or local authority bills or by lending at minimum
lending rate; this latter action in turn affects short-term in-
terest rates more generally. Between October 1972 and May
1978, treasury bill rate was normally the basis for the deter-
mination of minimum lending rate, but MLR has been de-
termined by administrative decision since then, though mar-
ket developments are still taken into account. Re-discount-
ing is automatic.
2. A 12.5 % reserve ratio was introduced in 1971 with the
implementation of the 'Competition and credit control' re-
gime. Reserve assets are either cash at the Bank of England
or assets which the Bank of England are prepared to convert
into cash either through open market operations or by lend-
ing secured against them (such as treasury bills and lending
at call to the discount market). The system allows the banks
wide freedom of manoeuvre since they can bid up deposit
rates and then acquire reserve assets; to some extent they
can also create such assets, by lending at call to the discount
market. Thus the UK does not operate on the reserve assets
ratio as a means of controlling the money supply di.
rectly.
Special deposits, in the form of a deposit with the Bank of
England interest on which is paid at treasury bill rate, are
also called from time to time. These are usually a relatively
low percentage of eligible liabilities (highest past rate 3,5 
and can be used as a technical smoothing operation to avoid
undue fluctuations in short-term interest rates.
3. The supplementary special deposits scheme has also
been imposed from time to time. This places a limit on the
growth of the banks' interest-bearing eligible liabilites; if
growth is in excess of this limit, the banks have to place non-
interest-bearing special deposits with the Bank of England.
The rate set when the scheme was reimposed in June 1978
was 5 % of an excess not exceeding 3 %, 25 % of an excess
between 3 % and 5 % and 50 % of an excess of over 5 %. This
system is clearly similar to a system of credit controls, but
one ofthe aims ofthe scheme is to limit the growth of banks
liabilities, while leaving them free to choose their asset
structure.
Qualitative guidance on the direction of bank lending has
also been given fairly regularly over the last 15 years, gener-
ally so as to ensure that sufficient finance was available for
manufacturing investment and exports while restraining
lending to persons and property companies. Hire purchase
terms control has also been in force laying down minimum
deposit and maximum repayment periods for lending for
certain categories of goods; the banks have been asked to
observe the same conditions for personal loans.
In September 1973, a limit of 9.5 % was placed on the rates
paid by banks for small deposits of under 1:. 10000. This was
to avoid small savings being attracted to banks largely at the
expense of building societies, at a time when it was thought
inappropriate for the mortgage rate to be increased.
4. Ceilings are placed on individual banks' overall open
position in foreign currencies and on the amount of spot as-
sets which may be held against forward liabilities in foreign
currencies. Provision has also been made for differentialNo C 166/38 Official Journal of the European Communities
rates of call for special deposits on domestic and overseas
deposits, so that the rate of call related to overseas liabilities
can be either higher or lower than that applied to total eligi-
ble liabilities if this is necessary for purposes of domestic
monetary policy. In practice, this provision has never been
used.
5, In addition to the instruments described above, the
Bank of England also operates actively in the gilt-edged
market. The prime objective by now is to sell sufficient stock
so that the monetary targets are met, but the authorities are
also concerned with the longer-run structural health of the
market.T
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o
r
m
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
e
d
.
)
 
A
c
t
u
a
l
l
y
 
n
o
t
 
i
n
 
u
s
e
.
(
3
)
 
I
n
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
a
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
t
o
 
w
a
r
d
 
o
f
f
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
i
n
f
l
o
w
s
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
:
l
i
c
e
n
s
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
o
n
-
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
m
o
n
e
y
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
p
a
p
e
r
,
 
o
f
 
r
e
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
b
o
n
d
s
:
 
p
a
r
t
l
y
 
i
n
 
u
s
e
;
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
n
o
n
-
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
'
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
:
 
n
o
t
 
i
n
 
u
s
e
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
7
8
;
w
i
t
h
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
 
t
a
x
 
o
n
 
n
o
n
-
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
s
'
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
b
o
n
d
s
:
 
i
n
 
u
s
e
.
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s
e
i
n
 
u
s
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s
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s
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n
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s
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s
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I
n
 
u
s
e
n
o
t
 
s
i
n
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9
7
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n
o
t
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
7
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2
)
i
n
 
u
s
e
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
n
o
t
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
7
1
_
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2
)
i
n
 
u
s
e
i
n
 
u
s
e
i
n
 
u
s
e
i
n
 
u
s
e
n
o
t
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
6
3
I
n
 
u
s
e
n
o
t
 
s
i
n
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e
 
1
9
7
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I
n
 
u
s
e
n
o
t
 
s
i
n
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9
7
6
n
o
t
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
7
4
i
n
 
u
s
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
I
n
 
u
s
e
i
n
 
u
s
e
i
n
 
u
s
e
I
n
 
u
s
e
i
n
 
u
s
e
n
o
t
 
s
i
n
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e
 
1
9
7
1
I
n
 
u
s
e
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7
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s
e
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e
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